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Chapter 1
Introduction
This is the first chapter of this project. Here an introduction to it will be provided. This
introduction will cover basic aspects such as what will this project be about, how the
project will be planned and developed, and how is this document structured.
1.1 Context
One of the main task of the security analyst job is to perform penetration tests in order
to check whether the system under study is secure or not. In order to check it, some
test need to be performed using several tools. The objective of these tests is to find
vulnerabilities on the target system that can be exploited in order to gain control of it.
There are lots of tools that can help a security expert performing his/her job. This
tools help by automating some actions that are necessary in order to obtain information
about or to exploit the target system. However, these tools are not enough to perform
a good penetration test. High creativity is required, as well as high knowledge on the
subject in order to succeed. But, the first steps of a penetration test require the security
expert to use these tools. In these first steps, the tools that people use are always the
same, and they have a natural order to be used in. This fact makes executing these
tools a little tiring, since it’s the least creative part of the process. Some tools need to
be used first, in order to gather the results and format them to be used as input for the
next layer of tools. This could take a lot of time from the tester, who could be doing
other more creative stuff.
1
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Doing a penetration test should be more about focusing on the creative parts of it instead
of having to do the first boring and repetitive steps, that is why the system that has to
be developed in this project aims at fixing this.
By automating most of the tools that have to be launched in the penetration testing
process, a security expert could focus solely on thinking out of the box and being creative
about the system s/he is studying. All the tools that need to be launched, and all the
interaction between them should be automatic. This will be the aim of this project,
building a system that automates most of the phases that a penetration test needs to
go through.
In order to develop this system, lots of research are needed to understand which steps
can be automated and which tools are used in each step. Then, with the penetration
testing process in mind, a system that gathers the tools, executes them, and integrates
their results has to be designed and developed. In order for this system to be useful for
security experts, the results should be clear and easy to understand.
1.2 Planning
This project is part of the Degree’s Final Project. This means that the project has
750 hours planned to be completed. These 750 hours are structured in 6 months, the
duration of a semester. This planning establishes nearly a full-time job of roughly 6
hours a day, 5 days a week, during the planned 6 months.
The planning of these 6 months is the following:
• Research - 1 month
• Analysis and design - 1 month
• Development - 2 months
• Experimentation and bug fixing - 1 month
• Documentation - 1 month
Since there is no prior knowledge of the penetration testing process, the research and
analysis phases will last as long as the development phase. During the state of the art
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research some documentation will also be done in order to make the last month lighter.
At first sight, this planning should be enough to complete this project with a working
system.
1.3 Documentation Structure
This documentation will be structured in 6 different chapters. First of all, this introduc-
tion, following the introduction, some state of the art solutions to the same problem will
be analysed, after that, the process of a penetration test will be defined and detailed, as
well as some of the tools used in it, in the form of a guide. After the guide, the system
will be discussed, starting by its analysis and design, and ending with its implemen-
tation and deployment. After the system has been described, some test cases will be
reproduced in order to demonstrate how the system works, and finally some conclusions
will be make, together with some economical analysis and future work.
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter two existing solutions similar to the project under development will be
studied. This two solutions are both security frameworks aimed at scanning web servers
in an automatic manner. This two frameworks are Golismero and OWASP OWTF.
2.1 Golismero
The first framework that will be studied is Golismero, a security framework built by a
team of three Spanish developers/security experts.
Golismero is a free software framework for security testing. It’s geared towards web
security and it incorporates a lot of well-known security tools like OpenVAS, Wfuzz,
SQLMap, DNSrecon, and many more. It uses the tools to test a web site, and then
reads the results of the tools to obtain results and feedback the rest of the tools. Once
it has finished, it merges the results and displays them.
It has integration with known standards for vulnerabilities, like CVE and CWE and
it allows to develop plugins to incorporate new tools to the system using a cloud-based
IDE.
The framework is platform independent and has no native library dependencies. This is
accomplished by writing it in pure Python.
This framework is aimed towards the first stages of the penetration testing process.
It does not try to exploit the vulnerabilities it founds. Instead, it generates reports
4
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Figure 2.1: Command line interface
Figure 2.2: Vulnerability Report
containing all the information it has found, in multiple formats. This formats include a
static HTML page and pdf creation.
The framework is used through the command line and the authors claim it has a better
performance than the rest of current security frameworks.
Figure 2.3: PDF reporting
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2.2 OWSAP OWTF
The Offensive (Web) Testing Framework is, as its name says, a testing framework that
focus on uniting great security tools together to make pen testing more efficient.
This framework has been developed by Abraham Aranguren, a member of OWASP. The
framework is OWASP Testing Guide-oriented, meaning that it classifies its findings as
closely as possible to the testing guide provided by OWASP. It also reports its findings on
the fly, meaning that as soon as a tool finishes, the results are updated on the database
and can be explored.
It is written in Python and works in any Linux systems. However, it needs the tools
to be installed in order to run them. It does not crash if a tool is not in the system,
though. It is easy to control and easy to run, using a command line tool for it, and it
provides some examples about its usage with several examples. It stores the information
obtained on a database and extracts data from it in a parsable format as well.
However, the reporting system, an HTML page that is updated when a tool finishes, is
a little bit chaotic and an upgrade project for this part is currently taking place.
This system, thanks to having OWASP behind it, has a great community of developers
that are constantly upgrading it. This happens through the participation on the Google
Summer of Code program, which invites students to work on a project baked by a mentor
from a technology company. With this program, the companies providing the mentors
also propose projects to upgrade their own systems. Besides from this output format
upgrade, one of the most interesting GSoC projects that OWTF has is the application
of Multiprocessing on the system.
Figure 2.4: OWTF - Reporting system
Chapter 3
Penetration Testing Guide
3.1 Information Gathering
The first stage in a penetration test is to gather as much information as possible about
the subject of the test. This step is crucial to understand how the system we have
to analyse is. In order to comprehend the target system we will use several tools and
techniques to discover different things about it.
Knowing what is present on the target is one of the most important things of the test,
since it defines the possible attack vectors. Discovering the target’s network structure,
the operative systems and the applications each machine uses, and information about the
users that use the system is vital to plan a successful attack. Once all this information
is known, attacks can be planned. This attacks can pinpoint known vulnerabilities of
the software used by the machines, and the information gathered about the users can
help completing the attack with some social engineering.
This section will be divided on two main parts. The first part will be based on finger-
printing the target. Using a set of techniques and tools to discover all the information
mentioned before. The second part will be directed to the fingerprinting of a web appli-
cation itself. The web application is usually the visible part of the target and has to be
tested as well.
7
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3.1.1 External Footprinting
3.1.1.1 Active Footprinting
DNS Discovery
The Domain Name System is a hierarchical naming system for computers, services or
any resource connected to the Internet or a private DNS network. This service helps users
ease their lives by encoding IP directions to meaningful character strings. This protocol
uses a lot of information and it stores this information in registers. This information
can be consulted and will help perform a first mapping of the network infrastructure of
the target.
Different kinds of information can be obtained from DNS servers. The main piece of
information obtainable from these servers is the infrastructure of machines indexed by
them. This servers provide the naming system to refer to all the machines inside the
target’s network, and this information can be gathered from the outside. Also, this
servers can provide collateral information about the browsing history of the users inside
the network. This would not seem like really useful information, but it helps performing
a social engineering attack.
There are several tools to discover the machines inside a domain. One of this tools
is Dig . This command-line tool directly asks a DNS server about the information in
its registers. This tool allows to discover the address of the target, the mail servers
associated to the target, the list of DNS servers linked to the target, and even other
domains assigned to these DNS servers.
Another way to get all the name servers associated to a domain is using a Metasploit
module called dns enum . This module lets the tester send multiple queries and is even
able to perform a brute-force name discovery from a dictionary. After configuring it and
launching it, this module presents the tester with the list of all the name servers it has
found.
Another tool that lets the tester obtain information from the name server is Nmap with
the option -sL. This option allows to perform a reverse DNS lookup for an IP range.
This scan will find, besides the name servers, all the domain names that these servers
are providing, together with their respective addresses.
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As mentioned before, an interesting feature of DNS servers provides testers with the abil-
ity to discover which domains have been visited from inside of the target’s organisation.
This feature is the cache of the DNS, and the technique to get this information is called
DNS Cache Snooping . This technique gives an attacker the necessary background to
perform a phishing attack. When a domain is visited for the first time, the name server
stores the IP address of that domain in the cache. There are two ways of getting this
information from the DNS cache.
The first one is through non-recursive queries, which consists of realising non-recursive
DNS queries. With these queries, an attacker can ask whether a domain is stored in the
DNS server’s cache or not. If it is on the cache, the query will return the IP address
of the queried domain. This method does not pollute the cache, but it is not always
available since sometimes recursive queries are forced.
The other method is through recursive queries This method does not make a differ-
ence between cached and non-cached domains, but it is still possible to deduce if the
domain asked was fetched from the cache or not. To deduce it, the tester has to take
into account the TTL time. Two different times will be noticed, the time that takes for
a cached answer, and the time that takes to ask for the domain translation to another
authoritative name server. The problem with this method is that the cache gets polluted
afterwards.
There are tools that automate this process. Some of them are command line scripts
like cache snoop.pl, or dns-cache-snoop. The tool Foca also has a DNS Cache Snooping
module that does this process automatically, using a file with the domains that have to
be checked.
Banner Grabbing
Banner grabbing is the technique that lets the tester extract information from banners
offered by the different services. This information is mainly the type and version of the
used software. There are several tools to get this information. Some of these tools are
Netcat and Ncat, the latter being an evolution of the first one. This tools connect to an
IP range and return the banners of the services that provide them. Ncat is able to work
over SSL, and can obtain banners from HTTPS ports.
The banners from an HTTP port can sometimes give away valuable information, like for
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example the methods allowed by the server. If the OPTIONS method is allowed, Ncat
will return all the methods allowed by the server.
Maltego
Maltego is a proprietary software tool used to gather information from public sources
and display it in a graphic way. This tool provides a set of transforms that can be done
over entities, being them both infrastructures and people.
Even though the work that Maltego can perform is doable with other tools, the graphic
way it presents its findings helps understand the relations that the entities under study
have.
As an example, if a tester starts with a domain name and s/he wishes to discover as
much information as possible, s/he can obtain -through transforms- information such as
e-mail addresses related to the domain, PGP server accounts, domain information, etc.
All this information is then presented in graph format, and the information obtained
can be also expanded. For example, the obtained e-mails can be used to profile the users
behind those e-mails using services like Twitter or Facebook, and the domain information
can be used to find all the other domains served by the same DNS server, or even to
find known vulnerabilities in the web server responding to that domain.
SMTP
SMTP is the standard protocol for receiving and sending mails over the Internet.
While performing an attack or a pentest, the main interest usually is on obtaining e-
mail addresses with the objective of performing some social engineering attack. However,
besides this obvious usage, the mailing protocol can help obtain even more information
about the target.
One of the ways it can be used is through the bounce back feature. In certain circum-
stances, mailing systems send automatic messages offering interesting information to the
receiver of these e-mails. For example, when an e-mail is sent and the recipient’s inbox is
full, the server sends back a message indicating that the message has not been delivered.
From this kind of messages useful information can be extracted, such as machine names
inside the network, IP addresses, or even firewall system’s signatures.
Another interesting way in which this protocol can be used is through the usage of the
VRFY (abbreviation for verify) parameter. This parameter is often used by spammers
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to identify usernames inside a web server. Using it, an attacker can ask whether a user-
name is present on the server or not, and if it is, the server will respond with the name
and the mailbox of that user. There exist tools that using a dictionary can perform a
brute force attack with this technique. Examples of such tools are Medusa or Metasploit.
A list of possible usernames has to be provided in order to perform this kind of attack.
VoIP
Voice over IP makes it possible to send voice messages through the Internet using the
IP protocol. Due to it being inexpensive, lots of companies are nowadays implementing
this systems for internal communication. There are several protocols that implement
this technology, such as SIP, IAX, Skype, etc.
This technology is vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping third-party conversations,
denial of service, information kidnapping, mailbox intrusion, etc. As a penetration tester,
this services have to be scanned and analysed as well. A simple, non intrusive scanning
could be using Shodan to detect any software related to VoIP. This could be done by
searching the string “VoIP” or by directly scanning ports that are known to host VoIP
related software.
Another way to analyse this type of systems is using the suite sipvivious, formed by a
set of tools aimed to audit SIP environments. This suite of tools allows the tester to
discover devices such as software phones and switchboards, to detect extensions inside
those devices, and even to launch brute-force attacks to access the devices using the
previously known extensions.
3.1.1.2 Passive Footprinting
Whois Protocol
Whois is a TCP protocol that allows to consult information about a certain domain.
It was typically used as a command-line order, but nowadays there are Internet services
that offer the same functionality.
This protocol lets the tester specify a domain, and it returns interesting information
such as the IP address, the name server serving it, the registrar of the domain and
information about it, and contact information about the administrator and the tech
support of that domain. Usually this contact information provides e-mail addresses and
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telephone numbers, which can be later used in a social engineering attack.
Whois also offers the option to do the opposite, to specify an IP address and receive the
domain name, and all the information related to it.
Google Hacking
Google is the most widely used search engine nowadays and one of the reasons, be-
sides its quickness, is that it indexes enormous quantities of web pages. It also offers the
possibility of performing advanced searches using a set of operators. This operators let
the users perform more effective queries, being able to restrict them to a site, or directly
search in the url. This advanced operators have caused the appearance of what is known
as Google Hacking, which consists of using search engines to find vulnerabilities in web
applications, to find sensitive information or even to profile web servers.
There exist databases where it is possible to find Google queries to find interesting in-
formation. One of them is “Google Hacking Database”, created by Johnny Long. It
indexes lots of queries grouped into categories like “Files containing passwords”, “Ad-
visories and Vulnerabilities” or “Web Server Detection”. This queries use the said ad-
vanced operators to find information that is publicly available on the Internet, even
though it probably should not be.
There also exist automated tools that perform this type of searches using known queries,
available in databases like the mentioned before, into search engines like Google or Ya-
hoo.
Pastebin, Pastie and Github services
Services like Pastebin, Pastie and Github offer the users a space to store text for a
period of time. This services are usually used by developers to store and share pieces of
code. Sometimes, this pieces of code contain sensitive information that is not supposed
to be publicly available, like passwords, database structures or source code.
There exist automatic tools that go through this services searching for leaked informa-
tion. One of them is called Pastenum, created by “Corelan Team”, which lets the tester
search for a concrete character string in several services at the same time. Security
teams inside companies should be aware of these practises and should monitor regularly
that no information leakage is produced.
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SNMP Discovery
The Simple Network Management Protocol eases the exchange of information amongst
the devices connected to a network. Amongst its functionalities there is the possibility
to obtain information about those devices, making it a good source of information.
One of the easiest ways to discover SNMP services is through Shodan. Shodan allows to
directly search for the port where this services are usually linked (port 161), discovering
lots of SNMP services within seconds.
3.1.2 Web Application Fingerprinting
3.1.2.1 Surface Discovery
Web applications can be related to a given DNS name or IP address in three different
ways, and we have to take them all into account.
The first one is using different base URLs. A web application can have its en-
try point at the base URL of the target, like this, http://www.example.com. How-
ever, there can be different applications associated to the same URL. For example,
http://www.example.com/url1 and http://www.example.com/url2 could be two dif-
ferent applications associated to the same symbolic name. Here, the base URL could
not be hosting anything, and both applications would be “‘hidden”, unless the exact
name is known.
The second one is using different ports. A web application is usually sitting on port
80, but it could happen that another web application is placed on another port. This
extra application could be an administrative interface, or something similar, and it has
to be taken into account.
The third one is using virtual hosts. There could be more than one symbolic names
associated to the same IP address. This 1-to-N relationship may be reflected to serve
different content by using so called virtual hosts. To identify which host the request is
referring, it is specified in the Host: header. An example of a virtual host would be
http://www.webmail.example.com.
So, how are these two options checked?
For the first one, some guessing has to be made. If the URLs are “hidden”, no reference
or knowledge of them will be present. In this case there are some options available,
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first a Google search could be performed using the advanced search operator site:. This
would display the “hidden” URLs if they can be indexed. If the URLs are not indexed,
then a guessing process has to be made to find these URLs. This process can be made
with the help of some dictionaries, or even with vulnerability scanners.
To address the second option, scanning the ports of the machine is needed. Probably
this process will be already done in the fingerprinting phase of the test. Using a tool
like Nmap will help discover web applications listening to non-default ports.
There are several ways to address the third option.
DNS zone transfers. This method requests a zone transfer to the name server that
serves our target in order to get the list of all the DNS entries for that domain. This
method could not work since most DNS servers do not honour zone transfers any more.
However, in order to try it the name server of the target is required. It can be obtained
by issuing the host command:
$ host -t ns www.example.com
Once the DNS server is obtained, the zone transfer can be requested. The response
to the request could be the desired list. This list could contain names that are not
so obvious, like webmail.example.com, or similar. To request the zone transfer the fol-
lowing command has to be used, assuming that ns1.secure.net is the DNS server of
www.example.com:
$ host -l www.example.com ns1.secure.net
DNS inverse queries. This method is similar to the previous one and could also not
work. Here, the objective is requesting inverse (PTR) DNS records. In order to do that,
the record type should be set to PTR and a query to the given IP address should be
issued. This query should return a DNS name entry.
Web-based DNS searches. Similar to the zone transfer technique, but relying on web
services that provide searches on DNS. This services can be queried with the target and
a list of names is presented. Then the results have to be cropped to obtain the desired
ones.
Reverse-IP services. Similar to DNS inverse queries, but querying web services instead
of name servers. It is advisable to query multiple services since they often return partial
results.
Googling. Using Google can help you refine and increment your perspective on the
target. It could help discovering new non-obvious names belonging to the same target.
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3.1.2.2 Application Entry Points
The structure of the target has been defined and a sitemap is available. Now it is
necessary to find the attack surface of the web applications. The likely areas of weakness
have to be detected and enumerated in this step.
This step aims at discovering all the browser-server connections that the application
has. In order to do that, all the HTTP requests have to be analysed (GET and POST
methods). This means that all the parameters and forms that these requests carry have
to be noted down, as well as any custom headers and cookies that could appear.
Usually, when sensitive information has to be sent, a POST request is used because
it does not show at plain sight all the parameters of the request, as GET does. But
even if it is a POST request, it is not safe at all, since several tools can capture this
requests and extract the parameters and analyse them. This analysis can be done with
an intercepting proxy or with a browser plug-in.
3.1.2.3 Robots.txt
The robots.txt is a file used by web site owners to give instructions to web robots about
their site. When a robot wants to visit a URL it first checks the file to see if it is allowed
to visit and index that URL. The file has the following format.
User-agent: *
Disallow: /
In this example, the file is excluding all robots from the entire server. You could make
rules for determined user agents, or use different Disallow lines to exclude specific parts
of your website. This is not a security mechanism, because robots can choose to ignore
this file, but usually the interesting parts of a web server are listed here. This provides
a good starting point for possible attackers and it has to be checked.
Getting the file from a web server is not difficult, it can be done with a simple wget call
with the target main address with robots.txt appended at the end.
Once we got the robots.txt file, we have to analyse it. There exist some online checkers
to see if the file is properly written and follows the Robots Exclusion Protocol.
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3.1.2.4 Analysis of error codes
When the error codes a web server provides are not handled correctly, they can give
away lots of information about the web server itself and the underlying software, as for
example, the database. So, the analysis of these error codes is really important because
it can give away information like the OS, the type and version of the database, etc. This
information can be used later on to find known vulnerabilities and the like.
To discover these error messages, requests have to be sent to the server. Some of them
can be found with standard, well-formed requests, but it will be necessary to craft
requests that generate error messages to get all of them.
3.2 Configuration Management Testing
The analysis of the infrastructure and the topology architecture of the target can provide
lots of information about it. This has to be tested in order to limit the information
leakage of the target.
3.2.1 SSL/TLS Testing
Even though there are really advanced cryptographic protocols and algorithms that
would provide a high grade security, they are not as extended as it would need be. Even
when the target has a high grade cryptographic protection, it could happen that due to
a misconfiguration the use of a weaker cipher could be imposed by the tester, and this
would suppose a security problem.
Nowadays, the http clear-text protocol is secured via an SSL or TLS tunnel. This
provides https traffic, which encrypts the data in transit. These protocols can also
provide identification through digital certificates. When a client connects to a server
through SSL, the first thing it sends, amongst others, is the set of characteristics that
the encrypted connection will have. This contains the encryption algorithm, the key
length and the hash algorithm. The key length will be the aspect that will define the
weakness of the whole cipher system.
So, this step is aimed at discovering weak cipher support. In order to do that, the ports
associated to SSL/TLS wrapped services have to be found. To do that, the same steps
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taken in the application discovery have to be found. Again, the best way is using nmap
with the option -sV. This option makes nmap able to identify SSL services. Once the
ports are identified, they have to be audited to check if they support weak ciphers. This
can be done with OpenSSL.
Other ways of doing this would be through vulnerability scanners, such as Nessus. Nessus
can scan the ports and reports all the weak ciphers that it finds.
Another aspect worth checking is certification. Certificates allow to establish the identity
of one or both parts of the connection. To set up the communication a set of checks on
the certificates have to be made. If any of these checks is not passed, a warning will be
issued, and it could mean that a security hole exists there. So, it is important to check
certificate validity. In order to do that, three different tests can be performed. First,
checking if the Certificate Authority (CA) is a known, trusted one, second, checking that
the certificate is currently valid, and third, checking that the name of the site and the
name reported in the certificate match. All these checks are performed and reported by
the browser. The list of certificates a browser has on its trust list can be checked and
modified, so, it is quite easy to perform these tests.
3.2.2 DB Listener Testing
The Database listener is a network daemon unique to Oracle Databases. It waits for
connection requests from remote clients. Since it is listening for connections, it can be
attacked and the database can be compromised.
Usually, major Oracle installations do not expose this service to the Internet, so the
tests should be done from the internal network. The listener is set by default to listen
on port 1521, but the new officially registered ports for the TNS listener are 2483 and
2484 when using SSL. However, it is a good practise to change the port to an arbitrary
one.
The potential areas of attack of this listener are to stop the listener, creating a DoS
attack, to hijack the Database setting a new password, to leak information from any
of the accessible files, and to obtain detailed information on the listener, database and
application configuration.
To test the security of the listener, the first required thing to do is to find the port where
it is listening. After doing that, a tool developed by Integrigy can be run. This tool
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tests if the password for the listener is set or not, if the logging system has been enabled
or not, and if the admin restrictions are set or not. These three aspects are important,
since each one of them represents a different attack area of the listener, and they should
be addressed if found incorrect.
3.2.3 Infrastructure Configuration Management Testing
The target of a penetration test is usually not only a single web server, but a complex in-
frastructure of web applications mixed together to provide a service. This infrastructure
could contain not only the web server on itself, but also application servers, database
servers, firewalls, proxies, and even administrative interfaces. When these infrastruc-
tures grow in size, the developers tend to pay more attention to the most important
parts and neglect the smaller, non-crucial or outdated parts. But even if the smallest
component of the infrastructure has a security hole, it could compromise bigger, more
important parts of the system.
So, understanding the said infrastructure is vital in a penetration test. Discovering not
only the web server and its version, but also the existence of application servers, the
usage of proxies, firewalls or other security mechanisms, the existence of legacy systems
still connected to the updated application. Not only discovering the different parts of
the system is vital, but also understanding how they communicate with each other. All
these could be used as an entry point for an attacker, and they have to be discovered
and analysed.
Web applications also require the usage of administrative tools to manage content, ap-
plication source code, or user authentication databases. This administrative tools can
be built-in on the server itself or provided by a third party. Also, these tools could be
accessible from a private Intranet or from the Internet. In the case these tools are ac-
cessible from the Internet, the authentication protocol and access control of these tools
have to be analysed thoroughly, since they can suppose a perfect entry point for an
attacker.
3.2.4 Application Configuration Management Testing
Once the whole structure has been checked, the configuration of the single applications
inside the system have to be checked as well. Each component of the structure could
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have its own vulnerabilities that might compromise the entire architecture.
Most of the systems used in web services usually come with generic configuration files
and code samples to show instantly how the service works. This is a great way for
developers to get to know the systems they have to work with, but it can pose a thread to
the overall system when these configuration files and examples are kept in the production
environment. Some of these examples are known to have vulnerabilities and should be
removed. To scan for these known files the use of a CGI scanner is recommended.
Another thing that could give away information about the configuration of applications
is code commenting. It is known to be another great tool for developers to understand
code and to clarify it, but when comments reach the final user they could also be a thread
to the application. Comments in the HTML or JavaScript visible from the client-side
should be removed.
3.2.5 Testing for File Extensions Handling
File extensions give away information about the technologies used inside a web applica-
tion and they can also help understand its behaviour. It could not seem like a security
threat, but it tells the attacker where to start searching.
Apart from giving away the technology of the application, file extensions should be con-
trolled also in the means of which files does the client receive. There are certain files
that contain private information, like configuration files, that always use the same ex-
tension. These extensions should be controlled and never returned to the client. Also, a
deep inspection of the file types returned to the client needs to be done. All files should
be checked to verify that they are indeed supposed to be served and that they do not
contain sensitive information.
This tests can be done using Web Spiders, Vulnerability Scanners, or manually inspect-
ing the application, which can be done with the help of a search engine.
3.2.6 Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files
Most files in a server are used to provide the normal execution of the application it-
self. But sometimes, there are files that do not serve this purpose. These files could
be old versions of current files that are working, automatic or manual backups, or even
unreferenced files that none remembers that are there. These files could pose a thread
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to the application giving away sensitive information like source code or configuration or
credential files.
Backup files could be easy to forget, since sometimes they are automatically generated
in a way transparent to the user. For example, when editing a file, some text editors
will create a copy of it, and it could stay in the server if not removed. This backup files,
or compressed user-generated files, if accessible from the client side, they will not be
interpreted by the browser, but downloaded directly and they could contain important
information such as source code, which would give the attacker a good insight of the
inner workings of the application.
Another similar case are old files. When a file is updated and the old file is left there
only with the appending of .old, if retrievable from the client side it will directly show
the source code of a previous version of the application’s code. This could also give the
attacker a huge advantage when trying to find a vulnerability in that code.
This situation may lead to severe threads to the application, and should be addressed
with a security policy accepted by the developers which should forbid dangerous prac-
tises. This practises would include editing files on the web server file system directly,
leaving behind archive files, not deleting old or unreferenced files, etc.
3.2.7 Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces
Admin interfaces are almost always present on web applications. They allow to per-
form privileged activities on the site, which should be only done by authorised people.
Checking if this is so is an important part of a penetration test.
First, the tester has to find if an administrative interface is present. This could be as
simple as requesting /admin on the main site, or it could be done through parameter
passing or a cookie variable.
Once found, the authentication protocol has to be checked to make sure that only autho-
rized users can access the interface. Some protection against brute force attacks should
also be considered.
3.2.8 Testing for HTTP Methods and XST
There are several methods offered by HTTP, even though only a few are commonly
used. However, if a web server is misconfigured, these HTTP methods could be used to
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perform malicious actions on the server.
As it is known, GET and POST are the most common HTTP methods, used to access
and modify information on the server respectively. But there are other methods that are
used, for example in REST Web Services (like PUT and DELETE). So, besides these
well known methods, there are methods that are not that well known and that could
pose a security thread. The dangerous HTTP methods for a web service are PUT, which
allows to upload files, DELETE, which allows to delete files on the server, CONNECT,
which could allow a client to use the web server as a proxy, and TRACE, which echoes
back to he client everything that has been sent to the server. There is another HTTP
method that would allow attackers to discover which HTTP methods does the server
allow. This method is called OPTIONS, and it returns the list of methods allowed.
So, if the server really needs to allow all these methods, it should do it in a really con-
trolled and monitored way, to ensure that they are used correctly and by trusted users.
There are some attacks that could be done with this setup. For starters, there are web
servers that allow arbitrary HTTP methods. This means that a web server would allow
to receive a “‘JEFF” or a “CATS” method and it would be treated as a GET method
with the particularity that it would not be subject to role based access control. This
means that an unauthorized user could send a GET request and receive the appropriate
response. Using this, for example, the unauthorized user could create a new user and
then give it admin credentials, all of this sending requests with arbitrary HTTP meth-
ods.
Another attack that could be performed using HTTP is XST, called Cross-Site Trac-
ing because it uses the HTTP method TRACE. This method, as said before, returns
everything that was sent to the server and it is used for debugging purposes. However,
it can be used to perform a sort of Cross-Site Scripting attack. This attack would be
also directed to stealing a user’s cookies. This is so because with the TRACE method
everything that is sent to the server is returned, including the cookies. To perform this
attack, the attacker would need to make the user send a TRACE request to the server.
When returned, this cookie could be stolen using another vulnerability, be it server-side
or client-side, and then used to steal the user’s session on the server.
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3.3 Authentication Testing
Authentication is the act of identifying something or someone, making sure it is au-
thentic. In computer science, authentication is the act of verifying the identity of the
sender of a communication. This is usually made through a login process. Testing the
authentication means understanding this process and using that information to bypass
the authentication mechanism.
3.3.1 Credentials Transport Over an Encrypted Channel
When a user logs into a website, there are different options to send the user’s credentials
to the web server. The credentials can be sent using the POST or the GET methods, and
the connection between the client and the server can be through HTTP or HTTPS. In
this stage of the penetration testing, the usage of HTTPS is verified. This is so because
the credentials sent through HTTP are sent in clear and could be easily captured with
a network sniffer. So, it is crucial to make sure that the credentials are sent through
HTTPS because it is built on TLS/SSL to encrypt the data that is transmitted, ensuring
that even if sniffed, it will not be available for the attacker.
To check whether the credentials are sent through HTTP or HTTPS a sniffer has to be
used to capture the packets and inspect them. In the captured packet, it can be seen
that if the credentials are sent through HTTPS, they will be addressed to the HTTPS
port of the server, usually port 443, instead of the standard address. On the other hand,
if the credentials are sent to the standard address, it means that the connection is made
through HTTP and that these credentials can be stolen with a network sniffer.
3.3.2 Testing for User Enumeration
When a login is made with incorrect credentials, a message is received from the web
server. Sometimes, these messages can give away some hints over the user database of
the application. This fact can be used to identify a set of valid usernames, which could
be later used in a brute force attack.
In this test, the tester should try to analyse the response messages from the authentica-
tion system, comparing the results when different credentials are provided. Sometimes,
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when a valid username is provided, the server returns messages like “wrong password”,
instead of “authentication failed” or something similar that does not give away that
the user exists. When these messages are discovered, the tester can begin a guessing
attack to identify a set of valid usernames simply by guessing the names and checking
the return message. This can obviously be automatized.
Sometimes the difference in the return message is more subtle, like for example using
URL redirections, or different error codes. The tester has to check for all the different
possibilities.
Another strategy for discovering usernames is URI probing. This method consists in
accessing user directories and checking the received error code. Some web servers, when
an existing directory is visited an error 403 Forbidden is returned while a 404 Not found
error is returned when visiting non-existing directories.
Analysing the recovery facilities of an authentication system is also a good way to dis-
cover usernames. When a valid username is introduced, the password reset mail will
be sent, and it will be stated there that it was sent, while when an invalid username is
used, a message will be displayed stating that the user did not exist. This method can
be used when the recovery system works with usernames instead of e-mail addresses.
3.3.3 Default or Guessable (Dictionary) User Account
Most current web server engines and underlying softwares are provided with a default
administrative account that is used by the developers. Usually this account is not deac-
tivated on the production environment and could be used to gain access on the system.
There can also be backdoors to the system left by the developers to access and test the
application, or simply, administrators that use easy usernames and passwords.
All these things can be used by an attacker to gain access to the system with admin
permissions. The default accounts on the current systems are known and can be found
easily on the Internet. Also, developers, testers and administrators of web servers usu-
ally use common usernames and passwords, like “admin”, “test”, “root” or similar, with
passwords that resemble the username.
Discovering usernames can be done by reading the comments on the available source
code, by finding the names of the developers of the web application, or by trying per-
mutations of the name of the company that owns the system. Using the testing method
in the previous section can reveal the list of usernames with admin permissions of the
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system. Once the list is long enough, a password guessing or brute force attack can be
done.
3.3.4 Testing for Brute Force
At this point of the penetration test, a few usernames could have been retrieved. A
brute force attack could be tried out now. In order to perform a brute force attack, it is
necessary to know how the authentication of the target works. There are two common
types of authentication.
The first one is using HTTP authentication. This method relies on HTTP messages to
perform the authentication. When a user tries to access a resource that requires authen-
tication, the server sends back a 401 response containing a “WWW-Authenticate” tag
containing the type of authentication and the realm where the client wants to authen-
ticate to. Then, the browser directly displays a message where it asks for the username
and the password, and then send it to server. There are two different types of HTTP
Authentication. The first one is called Basic, and it simply sends the username and the
password separated by a colon, and then encoded with base64. This method could be
easily be sniffed and decoded by an attacker. The second one is called Digest, and it
uses a one-time nonce sent by the server to create an MD5 hash of the password. This
is more secure than the Basic one, but the username is still sent in plain text.
The second one consists on custom HTML form authentication. This is the most widely
used method, and it simply consists on creating an HTML form where the client enters
the credentials. This credentials are then sent to the server. Usually, the credentials, or
at least the password, are sent hashed, but it is not an HTML feature, the developers
have to do it.
Once the Authentication type has been identified, there are several types of brute force
attacks that could be performed.
Dictionary attacks consist of automated scripts that try to guess usernames and/or pass-
words from dictionary files. This dictionary files could consist of common passwords,
or could be made from information gathered by the attacker from the web site or its
clients.
Search attacks are the most known attacks. This attack is based on covering all possible
combinations of a given set of characters and a length range. It is the slowest type of
attack because it tries all possible combinations with the given set.
Chapter 3. Penetration Testing Guide 25
Rule-based attacks use rules to generate better candidates for passwords. For example,
they can use part of the username and some pre-set rules to generate commonly used
password variations.
There exist tools that automate these brute force attacks. One of this tools is Hydra.
3.3.5 Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema
As it is known, the authentication process is meant to give access to private areas of a web
site only to the users that have permissions to access them. However, the authentication
schema used in some web sites is not completely adequate and can be bypassed.
There are several problems that could be found in an authentication schema, be it for
negligence, ignorance, or understatement of security threats. This problems can be found
in the different stages of software development. For example, on the design phase, the
designers could make a wrong definition of the parts to be protected; on the development
phase the input validation functionalities could be incorrectly implemented; and even
on the deployment phase there could be errors due to poor documentation or to a lack
of technical skills. These problems can be bypassed with several methods.
1. Direct page request: Some websites only control authentication on the login
page. If this is so, some of the supposedly private resources could be accessible
only by directly accessing them with the browser. Simply writing the page on the
address bar on the browser is the most straightforward way to test this method.
2. Parameter Modification: Some servers use parameters on the request to check
if the user is authenticated or not. To test this method, the tester should tamper
the request, either directly on the URL, or using a proxy to capture the request
and modify the POST parameters.
3. Session ID Prediction: Some servers use session identification values to auto-
matically manage authentication. If these session IDs are predictable, the tester
could try to find a valid session ID and gain unauthorized access to the application.
4. SQL Injection: This method could be used to authenticate without knowing the
correct password of the user. To use this method certain conditions have to be
met, which will be discussed later on.
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3.3.6 Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password and Pwd Reset
The password reset function is really handy when someone forgets or loses his/her pass-
word. However, it could be a thread to the user depending on how is it implemented.
The remember password feature is also useful for the average user, but depending on its
implementation it could allow an attacker to gain access to the system impersonating a
user.
Password Reset
This feature has two common ways of working. The first one is sending an e-mail to
a previously known address. The security of this method relies only on the security of
that e-mail address. The system assumes that it has not been compromised. The second
one is through secret questions. If a higher grade of security needs to be achieved by the
system, a combination of both methods could be implemented.
The secret questions method relies on a set of questions, usually predefined, that the user
has to answer when s/he registers. This questions are usually personal, and should be
difficult to answer unless you are the user. However, sometimes these questions can be
answered with some Googling, or using some sort of social engineering attack. Another
thing that should be taken into account is the number of questions the user has to
answer, or the number of times the user can fail a question before the system blocks.
All these aspects have to be taken into account when testing the system.
Another point to take into account is how the system presents the password to the user.
There are several ways. The least secure would be presenting the password in clear text
to the user. This would allow an attacker to log into the system without the user even
knowing it. Another insecure method would be directly asking the user to change the
password. This would provide the attacker with a way to log into the system, isolating
the original user outside. So, the common method again would be to send the new
password or a password reset link to a previously known e-mail address. This would
again rely on the e-mail account not being compromised.
Password Remember
This feature helps end users save time when logging into systems. However, it could
help an attacker gain access to the system. There are two ways of implementing this
feature.
The first one is using the “cache password” feature in web browsers. This method could
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be heavily insecure and it should be disabled. If an attacker would have access to the
browser’s cache, s/he could obtain the password in cleartext.
The second one is using permanent cookies. When using cookies, the password should
be at least hashed, and never sent in cleartext. To check it, the cookies stored by the
application have to be examined, and the hashing algorithm should also be checked to
see if it is secure enough.
3.3.7 Testing for Logout and Browser Cache Management
The logout feature is a really significant one, since without it, a user’s session could be
reused by an attacker to get inside the system and get sensitive information from it.
First of all, the logout feature should be available in two different cases, when the user
actively logs out and when the user remains idle for a specified period of time. The first
case is easily checkable, since a logout button or a logout function should be available
from the moment the user has logged in. In the concrete, web site login case, the tester
also has to check what has happened to the session cookies. They should be properly
invalidated, setting them to null or to an invalid value. From here, the next immediate
test is checking that the session is correctly invalidated. This is done hitting the “back
button”. If after hitting the back button the tester can see pages that s/he previously
visited, but not navigate into new pages, this means that the session has been correctly
invalidated and that some pages were cached in the browser. After this easy test, a more
complex one can be performed. It consists on setting the session cookies manually to a
valid one, using a proxy or a browser add-on, and checking whether the system allows
to navigate to pages that only logged in users can navigate. If it is possible, it means
that the server does not does not keep track of the active and non active session cookies,
and it could be a security threat.
In the case of a user staying idle for a specified amount of time, the user should be
logged out, and in the web case, the session cookie should be automatically invalidated.
To test this, the tester simply has to wait for the system to log him/her out. The time
it takes to log out a user due to inactivity should be taken into account, since longer
times pose higher threats to the users, and it also depends on the system under study.
Also, the tester has to check whether the log out is enforced by the server, by the client,
or both. This could be checked simply by inspecting the session cookie. If it has a login
time, or expiration date, it could possibly mean that the log out is enforced from the
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client. Tampering the session cookie can be a good way to ensure that the server side
also controls invalidated sessions.
One last thing that should be also tested are the cached pages. If the system allows the
browser to cache pages with sensitive data on it. This data could be easily gathered by
an attacker simply by accessing the browser cache. There are two ways of enforcing the
browser not to cache certain pages. It can be done through an HTTP response header,
or directly through an HTML tag on the code.
3.3.8 Testing for Multiple Factors Authentication
Some systems that work with sensitive data, such as banking systems, usually provide
multiple factors authentication to increase their security. This authentication system
works by providing an additional step in the authentication process. This new step is
usually related to “something you have” instead of “something you know”, providing
the user with a hardware device besides from the password.
There are several threats for this type of processes nowadays. These threats include
Credential Theft, Weak Credentials, Session based attacks, Trojan and Malware attacks
and Password Reuse. The optimal solution should address all the attacks related to these
categories. Unfortunately, it is really difficult to be protected from highly motivated
attackers.
There are several solutions out there, but not all solutions protect from all the mentioned
threats. This solutions provide with different ways of obtaining an additional password
that the user has to enter when s/he logs in. The process to obtain this password can
be done in several ways:
1. One-time password (OTP) generator token
2. Grid Card, Scratch Card
3. Crypto devices like USB tokens or smart cards
4. Randomly generated OTPs transmitted through a GSM SMS message
These methods have their weaknesses and their strengths, but there’s only one of them
that addresses all the threats mentioned before. Transmitting the randomly generated
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OTP through a secondary channel, such as an SMS, is considered one of the best ways
to do a two-factor authentication.
3.4 Session Management Testing
The Web is based upon HTTP communication, which is a stateless technology. But to
provide some user experience and allow interaction, web servers need to keep track of
the users’ actions on their sites. In order to do that, a session system has to be created
on top of HTTP. This system will link all user’s activities to a single stream of actions,
called session. Sessions need custom, third-party solutions to work. This solutions could
be customly implemented by the developers or provided by a middleware. To manage
these sessions, an authentication token needs to be issued to the user. This tokens are
usually called Session ID or Cookie.
3.4.1 Testing for Session Management Schema
As said before, sessions manage the actions of a user on the system through authentica-
tion tokens. This tokens, called cookies, have to be created in secure and unpredictable
ways and transmitted and stored encrypted or hashed. If these is not so, an attacker
could easily steal the cookies or forge a new one in order to hijack a session from a
legitimate user.
A cookie is created when the user first logs in and is sent to the user’s browser. Af-
terwards, every time the user performs an action, this cookie is sent to the server to
authenticate the user. The data inside the cookie could be diverse, providing the server
with information about the user, and thus, creating a state inside a stateless protocol
like HTTP.
The aim of this section is to try to forge a valid cookie to enter the system as a logged
user. In order to do this three steps will have to be completed. First, collecting a suffi-
cient number of cookie samples; second, reverse engineer the collected cookies to analyse
the generation algorithm; and lastly, try to forge a valid cookie to perform an attack.
When collecting cookies, the tester has to bear in mind that there could be multiple
factors that affect the cookie generation method. These factors could contain, amongst
others, the time of generation, the user browsing the system, the past actions of the user
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or the point in the application where the cookie has been generated. So, it is important
to collect cookies noting down all these factors, and trying to variate just one factor
between cookie collections. Automated cookie collection is advisable, since small time
variations could significantly change the cookie value if the timestamp is used as seed
for the generation process.
Once a sufficient amount of cookies has been collected, they have to be analysed in or-
der to discover their structure and possible information leakage. Cookies can sometimes
provide specific data about the user, this has to be checked. Cookies are often encoded
or hashed. The tester has to discover which type of encoding has been used and try
to decode it. Sometimes a hexadecimal or base64 encoding is used, making it easy to
decode. If a hashing algorithm has been used it could be more difficult to accomplish.
When decoded, the structure of the cookie can be seen directly or deduced. When the
structure is known, the tester should try to assess its predictability and randomness.
Examining different cookies generated almost equally, the generation algorithm could
be deduced. This process could be easy, being able to deduce it manually, or really
complex, needing some automatic mathematical or statistical tool to understand how
the cookie is generated.
Once the tester has discovered as much information as possible about the cookie’s struc-
ture and generation algorithm, the next obvious step is to try to forge a valid cookie in
order to hijack another user’s session. This step completely depends on the structure of
the cookie and how it is generated and transmitted through the net. The consequences
of modifying a cookie could vary from impersonating another user, to accomplishing a
buffer overflow of the variable where the cookie is stored on the server.
3.4.2 Testing for Cookies Attributes
As seen before, Cookies are the usual method to maintain a session for a user. Cookies
have a series of default attributes that should always be used correctly. If these attributes
are not correctly specified, they can provoke vulnerabilities on the session management
system. To check that these attributes are correctly used, an intercepting proxy can
be used to intercept the responses where a cookie is set. Once the response has been
captured, the cookie can be analysed. The attributes that could provoke a vulnerability
are the following.
Secure - This attribute specifies if the cookie has to be sent through an encrypted,
Chapter 3. Penetration Testing Guide 31
secure channel or not. So, when a cookie contains sensitive information, this flag to be
specified in order for the browser to always send the cookie through HTTPS instead of
HTTP.
HttpOnly - This attribute does not allow the cookie to be accessed by any technology
besides Http. This attribute is used to avoid a cross-site scripting attack by not allowing
JavaScript to access the cookie. This attribute should be always used, even though not
all browsers support this feature.
Domain - This attribute specifies the domain where the cookie can be sent to when
making a request. The domain attribute should be specified correctly, otherwise it could
provoke a threat. For example, if a cookie’s domain attribute is set to app.domain.com,
the cookie will be submitted to this domain and all its subdomains, but not to another
domain, such as app2.domain.com. However, if the domain is set too loosely, for exam-
ple at domain.com, then the cookie would be submitted to app.domain.com and also
app2.domain,com. In this case, if one of these domains were compromised, it could be
used to harvest cookies.
Path - It is checked after the domain attribute, and it is used to specify the URL path
where the cookie is valid. If the domain and the path match, then the cookie will be
sent in the request. Again, this attribute should be also specified correctly because it
could cause the same problem as the previous one.
Expires - Used to set persistent cookies. It specifies the date when the cookie expires.
Passed this date, the browser deletes the cookie. If this attribute is not specified, the
cookie only lasts for the current browser session. When a cookie has an expiration date,
it is stored in the user’s hard drive and could be retrieved by an attacker. So, if a
persistent cookie has to be used, no sensitive information should be stored in it.
3.4.3 Testing for Session Fixation
The authentication system of a web server should issue a new cookie identifier upon
logging in. Otherwise, a user account hijack could be possible.
More concretely, as an example, a user requests a web page from a server, this server
returns the web page issuing a new cookie with a session id. Then, the user authenticates
to the web server sending the cookie s/he has received. Two things could happen now.
The web server could respond to the authentication sending a new session id to the user.
This would be the correct behaviour. But, it could happen that the server responds to
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the user without creating a new session id. In this case, the server would be vulnerable
to a session hijacking.
In order to perform it, an attacker could send a valid identifier to a user and wait for
him/her to authenticate in the system. When the user authenticates, the attacker will
have a cookie with the privileges of the authenticated user, having achieved a session
hijack.
3.4.4 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery
The CSRF attack is based on using the authentication process of a website to make a
logged user do something in that website without its consent. It works by sending a
known URL to a user. This URL usually performs an action on the site that requires
a logged user. If the authentication system relies only on information known by the
browser, the action will be performed without the user even noticing.
The usual way of sending this URLs to vulnerable users is through the img HTML tag.
This tag allows to load an image from an external source, allowing to indicate a URL in
the src attribute. So, if the attacker sends a link to the victim that contains an image
tag with 0 width and 0 height and the action from the desired website as source, the
victim will not even notice s/he is in a compromised website.
To test this issue, the tester can take the roles of attacker and victim if s/he has access to
the restricted area of the target. If this is so, the tester should search for the appropriate
URL, then build an html page containing the http request referencing the said URL,
make sure that s/he is logged on the application, access the compromised html page and
finally check if the web server executed the request. If the request has been executed,
the target is vulnerable to CSRF.
In order to avoid this kind of attacks, the URLs that could be susceptible to being
attacked should include session-related information. This way, the attacker will have
a lot more trouble crafting the URL. Also, using POST instead of GET is a good
countermeasure, since POST attacks are harder to mount.
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3.5 Authorization Testing
Authorization is the step that comes after authentication. It is based on giving roles and
privileges to the authenticated users, giving them access to certain resources. Testing
for authorization means understanding how this process works and trying to bypass it.
3.5.1 Testing for Path Traversal
Many web applications provide access to files or resources, and they usually confine the
files a user is able to access inside a “root directory” which represents a physical directory
on the server. Web servers have mechanisms designed to control who can access certain
resources and who cannot. So, for example, an external user will not be able to access
resources outside the said “root directory”.
The problem here is that web applications usually have complete access to the server. So,
if the web application uses a server-side script to access files that is poorly implemented,
it could be an entry point for an attacker. This type of attack is known as path traversal.
In order to test for this, the following two steps have to be checked.
• Input vectors enumeration
• Testing techniques
Input vectors enumeration
The first step is to find all the application parts that could be vulnerable to input
validation bypassing. This parts include GET and POST queries, HTML forms and file
uploads, as well as all other parts that accept content from the user.
Some examples of possibly vulnerable URLs:
http://example.com/index.php?file=content
http://example.com/main.cgi?home=index.htm
There could also be cookies that are used for the dynamic generation of pages/templates.
Testing techniques
Once the input surface has been established, the input validation functions of this surface
have to be analysed. So, starting from the first example URL, it can be seen that it
loads the resource called content. If instead of content, an attacker would insert the
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string “../../../../etc/passwd”, the password hash file of a Unix system would be shown.
Obviously, in order to perform this attack, the underlying system has to be known. It
would not make any sense to request the passwd file in a Windows server. This attack
could be used to display restricted files, since the application is the one requesting them.
Also, this attack can be used to display the source code of the application itself, in
order to gain more knowledge about it to discover new attack points. For example:
http://example.com/main.cgi?home=main.cgi
This example would display the source code of the “main.cgi” file without even using
any path traversal chars.
Usually, the applications use countermeasures to avoid this kind of attacks, such as not
allowing the slash character, or by checking that the string ends with a certain file type.
This kind of countermeasures can be bypassed by encoding the path traversal string
or by using special characters such as the null character. It also has to be taken into
account that each operating system uses a different character as path separator.
3.5.2 Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema
This test focuses on verifying the authorization schema of the application. It tries to
discover if a user can access resources or fire functions that are denied to its role.
The objective of this test is to find whether a user without administrative privileges can
access resources or functions that are reserved to administrative users. For example,
the target could have a function to create a new user. If an unauthorized user were
able to use this function to create a new user, this would be a security threat, because
this newly created user could be created with administrative privileges, and thus, the
attacker would have complete control of the application.
Another test would be to try to access resources that are only accessible for certain roles.
For example, inside a shared directory where certain files are supposedly accessible only
by users with roleA, if one of these files is accessible by a user with roleB, this could also
be a threat to the system.
3.5.3 Testing for Privilege Escalation
Privilege escalation is the act of modifying a user account’s privileges without the per-
mission to do so. There are two types of privilege escalation, vertical and horizontal.
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Vertical privilege escalation is when a user gains access to resources granted to users with
more privileges than him/her. This could be used to perform administrative actions on
a system without being the administrator. On the other hand, horizontal privilege es-
calation is when a user performs actions that belong to a different user with similar
privileges. This could be used to access another user’s bank account in an online bank-
ing system.
In order to test this, the tester has to check all the portions of the application where
a user can create, receive or delete information from the database. The tester has to
check whether s/he can access any portion of the application as another user or not. The
tester should try to find where the role of the user is specified, if it is specified somewhere
besides the server. If a GET or POST request contains a parameter indicating a group
or role, this could be susceptible to a privilege escalation attack.
3.6 Business Logic Testing
The inners of an application, which determine how is it possible to interact with appli-
cation data, is known as business logic. This part of the application determines how
data can be created, displayed, stored and changed. Usually, the processes inside the
business logic of an application have a well defined structure, following a certain order
to perform certain actions. However, executing these actions in ways the developers did
not expect, or trying to perform them in a different order from the one established could
cause a flaw on the normal operation of the system. For example, if an authentication
system needs three steps to be completed in order, what would happen if a malicious
user goes from step 1 directly to step 3? Would it be possible to access the system
without authenticating? Discovering this type of things is the aim of this test.
As the reader could have guessed, this type of tests cannot be performed by automatic
vulnerability scanners. These tests are based on the understanding of the application
and the creative thinking of the tester. Since these tests are based on the tester’s cre-
ativity and intuition, it is really difficult to systematically address them. There are
no concrete guidelines for these tests, the tester will have to analyse the system and
construct the tests for him/herself. An approach to constructing the tests is provided,
though.
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Understanding the application. This first step is crucial to discover the vulnera-
ble points of the application. If available, the documentation of the application greatly
helps with this task, since it describes the expected workflow of the application. The
use cases designed by the developers could also aid the tester in this step, since they
often describe the limitations of the acceptable usages of the application.
Creating raw data for designing logical tests. In this stage, data about the busi-
ness logic has to be gathered. All the business scenarios should be identified, as well
as the different workflows. On top of that, the roles available on the system have to
be enumerated, identifying exactly which privileges each role has. If the application
provides groups or departments, they should also be identified and enumerated. Once
all this information is identified, a privilege table could be constructed to display it.
Developing logical tests. Here, the privilege table created on the previous step could
be used to define the tests. Also, the sequences of user interaction with the system have
to be checked, trying to visit them out of order. All alternative transaction paths should
be checked, if the same thing can be done in different ways, all these ways should be
tested. In addition, all client-side validations have to be examined as well, as they could
not be double checked on the server.
Standard prerequisites. In this stage, the user could create dummy users with dif-
ferent permissions to perform the tests.
Execution of logical tests. All the tests should be performed, analysing them with
care and trying to discover if there are vulnerabilities or not.
3.7 Data Validation Testing
Not validating the data that comes into the application is one of the most common
weaknesses of web applications. All data coming from a user has to be validated properly
before using it. Failing to do so can lead to any of the major vulnerabilities in web
applications. These vulnerabilities include cross site scripting, SQL injection, interpreter
injection and buffer overflow attacks. Input data from a client should never be trusted,
and always validated. This is a difficult task in bigger system though, because large
systems usually have lots of entry points and validating all of them is a huge task for
developers. In this section, the attacks regarding data validation will be visited.
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3.7.1 Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting
This type of XSS attack is one of the most used nowadays. It does not load with the
web server, it loads from the URI followed by the user. This attack has a great social
engineering component, since the attacker has to get the victim to follow a URI that
contains some script in it that will perform a malicious action. Usually, this malicious
actions contain installing key loggers, stealing cookies or changing the contents of the
page.
To test for this vulnerability two steps have to be followed, first, all input vectors have
to be detected. Wherever the application let’s the user input something through the
URL is a susceptible input vector. Second, all the input vectors have to be analysed to
detect potential vulnerabilities. In this step, the tester has to craft some input data to
see if some response is triggered. The usual crafted input is an alert, since it is harmless
but graphical. If an alert works, any JavaScript code could be inserted there, having
discovered a vulnerability.
An example of a XSS attack would be the following.
Imagine a simple web site with a welcome message that outputs “Welcome %user-
name%”, if the URI to this site is http://example.com/index.php?user=Tester, the
site will output Welcome Tester. Now, if a malicious user crafts the following URI, an
unexpected behaviour will take place.
http://example.com/index.php?user=$<$script$>$alert(Hello!)$<$script$>$
When this URI is loaded, an alert will be displayed. In this case, this alert is harmless,
but it means that a XSS attack could be performed, using any JavaScript code the at-
tacker wants.
The tester has to take into account that most applications might filter out key words
like “<script>” as a sanitation process. Writing the tags with a different encoding is a
usual practise to avoid this type of filters.
3.7.2 Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting
Stored XSS is a different type of attack, arguably the most dangerous one. Instead of
relying on the URI the user clicks, it relies on a piece of JavaScript code directly stored
in the web site. So, when a user browses to the compromised website, his experience will
be the usual one, but the JavaScript will be executed by his/her browser. This attack
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does not have the social engineering component of the previous one. In order to store
the JavaScript into the system, the attacker simply has to use an input form that stores
information on the database. When this information is viewed by another user, the code
is executed. This attack is more dangerous because it is not focused on a single user,
once the web site is compromised, all the users that browse through it will be attacked.
This includes possible administrators of the same website.
In order to test this kind of attack, the first thing the tester needs to do is to identify
all the input forms of the target. This includes user profile page, shopping carts, file
managers, etc. When all the input forms have been identified, the HTML code that
composes them has to be analysed, to check if it will be directly stored in the database,
and how it is positioned in the context of the page.
If there exist some client-side validations of the input forms, JavaScript can be disabled,
or the tester can use an HTML proxy to modify the request after the validation has
been passed.
With this kind of attacks, JavaScript exploitation frameworks can be used. These frame-
works help the attacker craft some JavaScript code that will directly connect all the com-
promised browsers directly to the framework itself, gaining full control of the browsers.
Another attack vector that the tester has to take into account are the file upload fea-
tures. If they allow to upload TXT or HTML files, the feature could be vulnerable to a
XSS attack. It should be verified that the upload does not allow to set arbitrary MIME
types.
3.7.3 Testing for DOM Based Cross Site Scripting
Both previous XSS attacks rely on information that is sent by a malicious user, reflected
or stored by the server, and seen by one or many users. DOM based XSS does not
rely on this technique, and it makes it harder to discover. This type of attack relies
on client-side code that populates the web site. For example, JavaScript code that uses
the DOM element document.URL to fill some information. The same example as the
reflected XSS attack can be used. In this case, the code that writes down the username
could be a script that uses the document.URL element. For example, with this code.
<SCRIPT >
var pos=document.URL.indexOf ("user =")+5;
document.write(document.URL.substring(pos ,document.URL.length ));
</SCRIPT >
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Using the same URI as the reflected XSS attack would generate an identical attack, it
would go first to the server, and then back to the user. If XSS prevention techniques
are applied on the server, the attack would be useless. However, if the following URI is
used, the attack would be totally different.
http://example.com/index.php#user=$<$script$>$alert(Hello!)$<$script$>$
The only change is replacing ? by #. This simple replacement tells the browser that
everything beyond the number sign is a fragment, not a parameter, and this is not sent
to the server. With this simple modification, all the possible XSS detection techniques
are ineffective.
In order to test for this attack, the tester has to search for all the DOM references used
on the client side code susceptible for manipulation. This references include:
• document.URL
• document.URLUnencoded
• document.location
• document.referrer
• window.location
Besides from this references, all the scenarios where the DOM is modified by client-side
code should also be inspected.
3.7.4 SQL Injection
This is one of the most well-known attacks, and it consists of injecting an SQL query in
an input form of a website. A successful SQL injection could read sensitive data from the
database, modify the database itself, execute administration operations on the database
and recover the content of files from the database. When performing an SQL injection
attack, there are two possible outcomes, the first one is the web site displaying an error
message generated directly by the database. This output gives lots of information to the
attacker. The second outcome is the web site displaying a custom error message. This
gives no information about the database and forces the attacker to perform a “blind
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SQL injection”.
The first thing to do to test for SQL injection is to detect all input fields where the ap-
plication connects with the database. Typical examples would be authentication forms,
search engines and e-commerce sites. When all the input forms have been detected, the
first easy test is to check if the inputs are susceptible to the characters single quote (’) or
semicolon (;). This two characters are the special characters for string and query termi-
nator respectively, and if not correctly filtered they will cause an error on the database,
which means that this field is susceptible to SQL injection. If the error is propagated to
the user, a lot of information will be leaked out. Otherwise, if the user gets a custom
error page, it will be more difficult to obtain that information.
Consider an authentication form that uses the following query to check if a user exists
and the provided password is correct.
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Username=’$username’ AND Password=’$password’
If the variables are directly obtained from the user via an insecure form, a malicious
user could input the following.
$username = 1’ or ’1’ = ’1
$password = 1’ or ’1’ = ’1
The query will then be:
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Username=’1’ OR ’1’ = ’1’ AND Password=’1’ OR ’1’ = ’1’
As it can be seen, this query always returns true, so the malicious user could authenticate
to the system without having any username and password.
Now consider the following query.
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE ((Username=’$username’) AND (Password=MD5(’$password’)))
Here there are two issues, the parentheses, and the MD5 hash of the password. In order
to address these two issues the following input can be used.
$username = 1’ or ’1’ = ’1’))/*
$password = foo
Here, the characters /* have been used. This characters designate the beginning of a
comment, and everything after them is ignored by the database. Also, a number of
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parentheses has been added to match the opened parentheses of the query. This query
returns a number of values, and sometimes the authentication code verifies that only
one value has been returned. To bypass this check the only thing needed to do is adding
the operator “LIMIT <num>”. This operator limits the number of values returned.
Adding it just before the comment character will help bypass this type of checks.
Another family of SQL injections is the usage of the UNION operator. It allows to join
two different queries in one, if they have the same number of parameters. This operator
is useful because it lets the user unite queries from different tables. If the malicious user
knows or discovers the names of tables with sensitive information, s/he can output the
tables using this operator. Consider that the web application has the following query.
SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=$id
If a malicious user uses the UNION operator to append another query after the id, the
final query could end up like the following one.
SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1
FROM CreditCardTable
In this new query, the malicious user wants to output the credit card numbers stored
on the database. The SELECT needs the same number of parameters as the original
query, that’s why the malicious query has two extra parameters without names. The
keyword ALL is also necessary to get around queries that use the DISTINCT keyword.
As mentioned before, there exists another type of SQL injection, named Blind SQL
injection. With this type of injection, the attacker does not have any feedback from the
application, due to custom error messages. Here, inference methods have to be used
in order to obtain information from the database. This inference methods use a series
of standard functions present in almost every database. This functions allow the tester
to identify the characters of a value one by one. To do so, the query has to obtain a
single character and then compare its ASCII value to the input of the user. Using this
technique and trying one by one all the characters, the attacker can deduce the value of
a field from the database. An example query would be the following.
SELECT field1, field2, field3 FROM Users WHERE Id=’1’ AND ASCII(SUBSTRING(username,1,1))=97
AND ’1’=’1’
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This query will return a value if and only if the first character of the value in the
username field is equal to the ASCII value 97. If it does not return a value, the attacker
increases the 97 to 98 ans submits again. When the first character is found, the starting
point of the SUBSTRING function is increased. As the reader could have guessed, this
method is really slow. That is why there exist automated tools that perform this kind of
attacks. One of this tools is SqlDumper, which performs requests to a MySql Database
through GET requests.
Chapter 4
Design and Implementation
4.1 Objectives
The main objective of this project is to automate the penetration testing process in
order to aid security experts in their work.
This main objective creates several key points that need to be noted as well. These key
points will be addressed in this section.
• The system should cover as many parts of a penetration testing process as possible.
• The system should be configurable by the security expert using it, in order to suit
its preferences.
• The system should be able to incorporate new tools in an easy way.
• The results found by the system should be presented in an easy-to-understand
way.
So, this main key points are the objectives that this system needs to cover to be able to
really help in the penetration testing process.
The first key point is really important, since the more parts of a test this system covers
the more useful it will be. A system that only runs the tool Nmap will not be of any use
to a penetration tester, since s/he can run Nmap directly instead. The objective is to
cover most of the parts of a penetration test, beginning with the Information Gathering
43
Chapter 4. Design & Implementation 44
step and using the information obtained to advance through the different steps and pro-
duce an easy to understand report. Since the process is linear, this objective will also
be linear, starting with the Information Gathering step and once sufficient information
is gathered, it will be used to start the Vulnerability Assessment step and so on.
A configurable system can adapt to different situations and different types of users.
This objective is also important because it helps broaden the potential users of the
system. For example, the system should let the user decide which types of tools use or
choose which steps of a penetration test s/he wishes to do. This is important because
a penetration testing process can be a slow and long one, and if some step needs to be
repeated, it would be a complete loss of time to perform a complete penetration test
again. It should also be desirable to be able to differentiate between inside and outside
tests depending whether the tester is inside the network s/he wants to test or not, and
in the case s/he is outside the target network, it could be interesting to be able to choose
between passive and active tools.
Cybercrime is a growing issue and since technology keeps evolving, cyber criminals have
to evolve they attacks as well in order to find new vulnerabilities. This new vulnerabilities
and the way to exploit them has to be incorporated in the existing security tools or
implement new security tools in order to address them. This process is continuous and
a penetration tester has to be continually updating his/her knowledge base. This means
that our system has to be able to update its knowledge as well. In order to do this, the
system needs to be easily expandable. To expand a system like this means to add new
tools that are either better than the current ones or that they cover new aspects of the
cybersecurity world, like new technologies.
The reports presented by current vulnerability assessment frameworks are usually long
documents with all the information gathered by the multiple tools used. This could
seem the desired output, and sometimes is, but these documents can be more than 200
pages long, and reading all of it can be extremely boring. This documents usually have
multiple parts. One of the important parts is the part where all the vulnerabilities found
by the framework are listed, and a solution is proposed for these vulnerabilities. This
part is important to the coders of the system under study because it pinpoints where
the problems are, and usually offers a good solution to fix them. Another important
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part is the summary of the findings, usually directed to the management of the system
under study to give a broad vision of the security of the system.
For security experts, the part where the vulnerabilities is listed is usually the vital one,
since it tells the tester where to continue looking in order to exploit the system. However,
this part is usually the output of all the vulnerability scanners combined, and it makes
it really difficult to read and understand quickly. Finding a concrete vulnerability for a
concrete service without knowing relevant information like the CVE of the vulnerability
can be truly difficult.
For all these reasons is why one of this systems’ objectives is to provide an easy-to-read
and easy-to-understand output. In order to comply with this objective, the output of
the system will not be a large document with separate parts for separate tools. Instead
of this, the system will collect the results of the different tools in a database and will
present the results in a unified way.
4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 The tools
The most crucial part of this system will be the tools that it uses. This will be the main
strength, since it will gather more information as it integrates more tools.
But, which types of tools does it need?
There are some aspects to be considered when selecting tools to incorporate unto the
system. First of all, since the aim of this system is to be as automatic as possible,
the tools should be as automatic as possible, this means that they should not require a
constant interaction from the user. This is an important aspect, because it discards some
of the tools that are currently being used. There exist several frameworks and complex
tools that use graphical interfaces to interact with the user continuously. This type of
tools or frameworks, even though they are usually the more advanced and powerful, are
not recommended for this system. This is so because the interaction with the user wants
to be minimal.
This minimal interaction with the user is easily achievable with command-line tools,
or external tools that can be launched via the command-line and do not need any
interaction. This does not mean that the tools need to be simple ones. For example,
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Nmap is a command-line tool and it is a really powerful tool, being able to scan a whole
network and discover all its machines and the services residing on the open ports of
those machines. Another example would be The Harvester, a command line tool that
uses search engines to discover usernames, email addresses and virtual hosts related to
a target.
Another interesting aspect about the tools that have to be used is the ability to parse
their results. The tools included in the system should preferably have an easy-to-parse
output format. Usually, this kind of tools have XML output reporting, which is one
of the easiest ways to parse the results into the database. There exist XML parsing
libraries in almost all the current programming languages.
The parsing of the tools will be one of the key points of the system, since it will be the
part where the output of a tool is collected and integrated into the database. When a
new tool wants to be added to the system, a parser for this tool has to be created and
added to it.
There exist tools in the current market done by security companies that require really
high fees to use them. Since this system is part of a Degree’s Final Project, all the tools
used on it will be free of charge. However, due to it being expandable, proprietary tools
could be added afterwards by the users.
Having all these aspects in mind, the tools chosen for this system are a subset of the
optimal selection of tools that this system would need to be complete. Since the devel-
opment time of this project will be not that long, the focus of the tools used will be
on the information gathering step of a penetration test. Focusing on the information
gathering step will allow the system to settle an attack surface. This attack surface has
to be as complete as possible in order to establish a good starting point for the next
steps. And since the information gathered in this first step has a really wide range, it
will help complete the data model that will store all the information. This means that
even though there are lots of different types of vulnerabilities and different tools to find
them, they will always be a vulnerability stored in our system. On the other hand,
the information gathering step can find things like machines and ports, but it also can
find usernames, email addresses, the services residing on the found ports and even the
software used to generate the files published on the Internet. Having this wide range of
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information on the system is really important because it gives the security expert lots
of possible entry points.
4.2.2 The programming language
After the research done in the first stages of this project, it is clear that the system
that will be build has no specific programming language constraints. Any programming
language that could launch command-line tools, parse the results of those tools and
then display information in any way could suffice. However, after analysing the current
security tools and frameworks that are being used nowadays, the tendency of those tools
and frameworks is to code them in Python. Obviously not all tools are coded in Python,
but most security frameworks and lots of open-source security tools are.
After discovering this fact, an analysis of the language has to be done before selecting
it, to check if it suits all the needs of the system.
First of all, Python has lots of documentation available online and has a great community
behind it. This fact, together with the fast learning curve it has, makes it really easy
to learn how to code in Python for people who have never used it before. Obviously, a
coding background is needed to learn it fast enough to code a system like this. The fact
that Python uses an interpreter also helps a lot, because it lets the coder test everything
really quickly.
Besides the learning facts, Python’s aim is to be extremely readable, and this makes it
really good for collaborative projects or projects that have to be evaluated.
Python, thanks to its extensive community, has lots of useful libraries to do all kinds of
things. After some research, interesting libraries can be found that are really useful for
this project.
One of this libraries is called Pexpect. This library lets the user launch bash commands
in a controlled way, and even communicate with the bash commands if necessary. It
also retrieves the output of the command and presents it as a String. The functionality
provided by this library is clearly useful for the system under construction. This func-
tionalities could also be achieved with a Python standard library called os, but the fact
that pexpect allows interaction with the commands is a great pro.
Another good point towards Python is that it has several libraries to code and deploy
web pages. Libraries such as Django are widely used in the professional world to build
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websites. A web interface could be a good way to display results in an easy-to-read,
interactive way. However, Django is a bit too complex to suit the purpose of the web
interface that could be created to display the results of the system.
There exists, however, another library called Flask. This library is in fact a microframe-
work for web development. It has the ability to easily build an API, and then it gives
the coder the tools to build templates for the web interface of the API. All this is made
in a simplistic way, and deploying the API is also extremely simple. This kind of mi-
croframeworks are not recommended for production environments, but for the purpose it
has to be used in this project, Flask is one of the best options to build the web interface.
After all the research done, the conclusion is that Python is a really good candidate to
code the system with. Also, the libraries found are only a small flavour of the whole
lot of libraries that Python has. This two will be really useful by easing the process of
building the system, but many more could be used, for example for parsing resources.
All this research has made it clear that the system will be coded in Python.
4.2.3 The phases
In this section an analysis of the different phases of a penetration test will be related to
the system under construction. The tools that will be used will be listed here, and some
explanation about the problems found during the analysis of each phase.
Information Gathering
There are lots and lots of tools that could be used in this stage of a penetration test.
There are lots of areas that need to be covered, and lots of information to be found
about a target. An important part of this stage is that no previous knowledge on the
target is required. This means that all the tools that will be launched in this stage will
only need the target’s IP address or name to function.
In this phase lots of information will be discovered and integrated into the database. It
will be the stage with more tools in our system and those tools will try to cover most
aspects of the target.
First of all, one of the most important tools in penetration testing is Nmap. Obviously,
this tool had to be used due to its high usefulness. Nmap is able to discover machines
inside a network, and for each machine, it can discover interesting things such as the
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operating system of the machine and the opened ports that this machine has. Besides
from discovering the ports, it also discovers the service that is listening in each port. All
this things make it an important tool to use, since all the information it finds is really
useful and establishes the attack vector for next phases. In this system, Nmap will be
used to discover the operating system of each machine found in the network, as well as
the active ports in them.
Another area that needs to be analysed is the DNS system of the target. In order to
find the name servers of the target a pair of tools will be used. First of all, Dnsenum
will be used to find name and mail servers of the target. The machines found will be
added to the system to be scanned later with Nmap. The other tool that will be used is
Dnsrecon. This other tool is used for exactly the same as Dnsenum. While researching,
it has happened that this two tools gave different results, and this is the main reason
why two really similar tools are being used.
Another aspect that this phase has to cover is discovering subdomains. In order to do
that a tool called Dmitry is used. This tool can be used to discover multiple things, like
performing a whois lookup, discovering email addresses and subdomains, and performing
TCP portscans. For this project, Dmitry will only be used to discover subdomains, this
is so because other tools will be added that cover the other aspects of Dmitry.
Search engines can provide lots of information about a target. Usually the information
gathered from search engines can be used in Social Engineering attacks. This infor-
mation can range from subdomains of the target to the software used to produce the
publications the target has made available. In this project, two tools will be used to
gather information from search engines. The first one is Metagoofil. This tool gathers
all the documents published by the target and extracts information from the metadata
on those documents. The information contained in the metadata that Metagoofil finds
and the system gathers is email addresses and usernames.
The second tool that will be used is called TheHarvester. This tool uses search engines
to directly search everything related to the target. It finds subdomain paths that have
been crawled by the GoogleBot crawler, and it can also find email addresses from people
working on or related in any way with the target.
Web application firewalls are not really well-known pieces of software, but they can help
prevent attacks from the outside. They control all input and output of the web server
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and block any potential risks. There is a small tool that lets the tester discover if the
target is under a web application firewall, and in the case it is, it also tries to find out
which one is being used. This tools is called WafW00f. It will be used in the project
to find out this extra information about the target.
Vulnerability Assessment
This penetration testing step also has lots of tools available. Since there are lots of dif-
ferent vulnerability types, there has to be tools to cover them. However, most of these
tools need some kind of previous knowledge on the target. For example, to launch a
Wordpress vulnerability scanner the tester needs to know that the target has a Word-
press web server. Another example would be SQL Injection scanning. This type of
scanning needs a vulnerable link in order to launch all the known attacks. This tools
will only check if the link provided is vulnerable to a series of known attacks. This fact
makes it really difficult to launch this type of tools automatically.
However, there exist general scanners that, for example, scan a web server in order to
find interesting things and known vulnerabilities that globally affect the target. One of
such tools is Nikto. This tool will be the main tool used in this phase of the pene-
tration test. It scans web servers to find potentially dangerous files or CGIs, it checks
for outdated versions of the servers and it scans for server configuration items such as
multiple index files or HTTP server options.
When Nikto has finished scanning a web server, it presents the vulnerabilities it has
found with a description and a link to the vulnerability on the web server, amongst
others. This information will be stored in the database.
One of the interesting things that Nikto gives for each vulnerability is its id inside the
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB). This id can be used to find more infor-
mation about this vulnerability, for example, on the OSVDB website. However, there
is more than one way of classifying vulnerabilities and different entities have different
databases. The most common one is the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE),
which is maintained by the MITRE Corporation and is funded by the National Cyber
Security Division of the United States Department of Homeland Security. Having this
entity funding it makes this system kind of the standard one. However, since there is
more than one system, it happens that different tools offer different information. In our
case, Nikto provides OSVDB ids. The desirable case would be to be able to convert
OSVDB ids to CVE ids, but doing this is more difficult than it seems.
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There exist web servers that provide user interfaces to get the conversion from OSVDB
to CVE, but there is no way to automate this conversion massively. There exists an API
that allows queries to get the conversion, but it only accepts two queries per day, and
this would be useless in this system.
In order to use more than one tool in this step, another scanning tool will be used. The
tool is called wpscan and it is used to scan Wordpress websites. It scans for outdated
plugins and themes and can obtain default users. In this system it will be used to scan
only outdated plugins that are linked to a known vulnerability. This tool also provides
vulnerabilities with the OSVDB system.
Exploitation
The number one exploitation framework is Metasploit. It provides the whole envi-
ronment for detecting targets and exploiting them. However, our system aims at being
automatic and using metasploit automatically is not that easy.
As it has been stated previously, there is not a clear standard on vulnerabilities. Due to
that, there does not exist a clear relation between a concrete vulnerability and an ex-
ploit. When gathering information about known vulnerabilities, sometimes the database
providing the information provides some known exploits for exploiting it, but this is not
common practice. Due to that, intelligent automatic exploitation of a target is extremely
difficult. A possible solution could be to launch all known exploits independently on the
target, but that would be extremely time consuming. However, there exists a module
for Metasploit called db autopwn.
db autopwn is a module that feeds from the output of Nmap and launches all the exploits
it knows accordingly. It can be configured to launch exploits related to port numbers
or directly launch all exploits. If an exploit is successful, the module opens a session on
the target, meaning that the tester has access to it. This could seem like the perfect
solution for this project, but there are some problems. This module is a deprecated one.
It was deprecated because it was unstable, it crashed some systems, and it did not fit
the framework’s scope. The developers of Metasploit do not encourage the usage of this
module, but it’s the only automatic exploitation option currently available. Intelligent
exploitation is the one advised by the framework’s developers, and this makes a lot of
sense, since launching countless exploits to a target without even knowing if any of them
will work is not a smart move. However, for the sake of demonstration, the system will
be able to launch the db autopwn module to the target if the tester desires it.
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Post Exploitation
Once the pen tester has gained access to a system, s/he still has some work to do.
Sometimes the access point is not that interesting and the tester has to jump from one
machine to another until s/he finds interesting stuff. This process can also be done with
Metasploit. The framework provides modules to jump from machine to machine in a
semi interactive way, using console commands.
This process in itself would be really difficult to automate, since it is really environment-
dependant, and could be different every time. On top of that, the system should be
previously aware of the network inside the target, or have some methods of discovering
it once it’s inside. On top of that, the system should be intelligent enough to know
which machines would contain sensitive information inside the network. All these things
are really complex to automate and would require an adaptable Artificial Intelligence.
This is obviously out of the scope of this project.
So, having in mind that it would be really difficult to do, and also noting that the
system is probably unable to exploit the target in the first place, this step will not be
implemented on the system. It makes no sense to cover this part if intelligent exploitation
is not possible.
Reporting
This is the step where the system creates a report of all the findings. As stated before,
current system output large pdf files with all the vulnerabilities found and all the infor-
mation available on them.
One of the objectives of this system was to provide easy-to-understand reports, and
a good way to do it is to provide an interactive way of visualizing the results. Since
Python has easy ways to code websites, the reporting system will be done through a web
page that will interactively present all the findings of the system. This system makes
finding information easier and it is much more intuitive than a 200-pages report. The
information will be provided on a machine basis, and the tester will be able to select
which information s/he wants to see.
All the information gathered by the system will be stored on the database. This fact
gives the possibility of outputting a pdf report of all the findings, but it will not be a
priority for this project. The web interface is believed to be a much more intuitive and
easy-to-understand way of showing the results.
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4.3 Design
4.3.1 Data Model
One of the most important parts of this system is the data model, because it is where all
the information gathered by it will reside. This data model has to be able to represent
machines inside a network, and the vulnerabilities each machine has.
The core of this system’s data model are the audits. An audit is the representation of
the penetration testing process. As such, an audit always has a target, the date when
it was created, and a pair of optional attributes that keep track of its progress.
User
username String
password String
email String
Network
company String
1
n
Audit
target String
created DateTime
current_phase String
progress Float
Machine
Address String
Name String
Os String
Waf String
cpe String
1
n
1
n
1 n
Employees
name String
email string
1
n
Figure 4.1: Audit
As a result of running an audit, the system will find machines related to the target of
the audit. This machines are represented as a data class as well. Each machine has an
address and a name as primary identifiers. Different information about the machines in
the target is collected, and this information has to be stored in the database as well.
This information includes the Operating System of that machine and its associated cpe
and if it has a Web Application Firewall or not. Each machine is scanned in order to
find information about the ports it has in use, and the services listening to those ports.
For each port some information is stored. This information contains the number of the
port inside the machine, the service it provides and its state, and the product that is
giving the service, together with its cpe.
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Machine
Address String
Name String
Os String
Waf String
cpe String
Port
number int
service String
state String
product String
cpe String
1
n
Figure 4.2: Machine with Port
Once the ports have been identified, the system will search for vulnerabilities in those
ports. For that, each port has associated a number of vulnerabilities. Each vulnerability
has a name, a description, a link to the vulnerability and the tool that has found it.
Additionally, they have the ids corresponding to the OSVDB and CVE systems, if the
tool provides them.
Vulnerabilities
name String
description String
osvdb String
cve String
link String
foundBy String
1
n
Port
number int
service String
state String
product String
cpe String
Figure 4.3: Vulnerabilities
The tools that the system uses can discover usernames and email addresses regarding
to a target. This information has to be stored in the database as well. In order to store
this information, there exists a class named employee. This class does not necessarily
represent an employee of the target’s company, it is merely a container for either a
username or an email address. In the case a tool is able to extract both the username
and the email address of the same person, it could be stored together as well.
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Audit
target String
created DateTime
current_phase String
progress Float
Employees
name String
email string
1
n
Figure 4.4: Employee
In order to control the audits, there exist two different classes. The firs class is the User.
This class represents a user of the system, and as such, it identifies it with a username
and a password. It also asks for an email address, but it has no use yet. This class
controls who creates Audits.
There could be the case where a tester wants to perform the same audit more than once.
In this case, it could be helpful to have all the audits that are directed to the same target
together. To provide this scenario, there exists a class in the system called Network. A
network is identified by a company name. This company name represents the target
that wants to be tested. Then, the network comprises all the Audits that are performed
towards the same target.
User
username String
password String
email String
Network
company String
1
n
Audit
target String
created DateTime
current_phase String
progress Float
1 n
1
n
Figure 4.5: User and Network
Lastly, the system’s database also incorporates the tools that the system will use. To
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store the tools the command line that calls them has to be saved, along with some
options of each tool. For each tool some attributes are saved as well, to get some extra
information. This extra information could provide some customization to the system,
for example to call only passive tools. The phases of the penetration testing process will
also be stored, in order to have each action linked to a phase. This allows to quickly
select all the tools that a phase needs to complete.
Phase
name String
order int
Action
tool String
options String
active? Bool
fileOutput Bool
n 1
Figure 4.6: Phase and Action
In order to manage the data model, Object-Relational Mapping is used. This is achieved
by the usage of a Python’s module called peewee. This module is a small and expressive
ORM that includes support for sqlite, mysql and postgres databases. This module makes
managing the database really easier, and allows for complex queries in really simple
lines of codes. As this is a small and simple data model, it would be tempting to use a
simple database engine like sqlite, however, since the aim of this project is to build an
expandable system, the database engine chosen for the system is MySQL. MySQL is a
powerful and well-known database engine which can be used in conjunction with peewee
in order to make it simpler.
This is the complete data model for the system. However, esCERT UPC has provided
the database of one of its tools, called Altair. This database contains information about
known vulnerabilities, amongst others, and will be used to find vulnerabilities related
to certain CPEs. This will provide some extra value to the system, getting information
related to systems that is not gathered by any analysis tool.
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password String
email String
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Phase
name String
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Name String
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tool String
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fileOutput Bool
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Figure 4.7: Complete Data Model
4.3.2 Tool Integration
The only thing that all the tools that are used by the system have in common is that
they all are command line tools. This could suppose a problem in the sense that a
custom class should be created for each tool that has to be used. Each tool would have
it’s way of launching it, with different options, and different output styles. This could
mean lots of work if someone would want to expand the number of tools in the system.
Instead of doing that, a simpler solution will be taken. In this solution, there exists a
generic class able to call any command line tool with root privileges, and a collection of
parsers, here, of course, one per tool, that would parse the output of the tools. With
this system, calling any tool is really simple, and the only thing that has to worry the
user is adding the parsing function to the collection. Since the parsing function had to
be created anyway with the other model, this model does not add additional complexity.
This model of tool integration has two differentiate parts. The class that launches
the tools, which will be called Tool, for obvious reasons, and the collection of parser
functions, which will be stored in a file, together with a simple function that will retrieve
each parsing function with the only need of the name of the tool it parses.
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The class Tool has some attributes, which correspond to the information stored in the
database for each tool:
• The name of the tool
• The options that the tool uses
• The target of the tool
• Whether the tool generates a file output or not
The only information that is not stored on the database is the target, which is set by
the user at the start of the audit.
In almost all tools used in this project, the target is specified at the end of the command
line. In the event that a tool cannot specify the target in the last place, but has to
specify it in the middle of the options, a macro has been created. The class will search
for the existence of the keyword %target% and if it exists, it will be replaced by the
target of the tool. If it does not exist, it will be appended at the end. There also exists
a second macro with the keyword %file% to specify the name of the output file. This
macro has little use because it can be specified when the tool is stored in the database,
but it has been created for special cases.
Once the Tool class has been instantiated with all the correct values and the target has
been fixed, a function called run() can be used to execute the tool. This function uses
the pexpect module to spawn a child with the execution command of the tool. It also
calls the tools with root privileges because certain tools need root privileges to be used.
When the tool has finished its execution, the standard output of the tool is stored in an
attribute of the class. This output can be then requested if necessary. Since most of the
tools used can generate a file output in a parsable format, this attribute is not always
used.
When the tool finishes its execution, the parser function of the tool has to be retrieved
and used to obtain the information this tool has gathered. The parsing functions will
be retrieved by a function that uses the name of the tool as a key to the function that
parses it. As all the functions are retrieved in the same way, they all need two obligatory
parameters, the resource with the file or the string containing the output of the tool, and
the audit where the tool execution belongs to. The parsing functions can have additional
parameters but they need to have a default value.
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Each parsing function is the one in charge of storing in the database the information
gathered by the tool. All functions will be different and depending on the output format,
they will use different strategies. The most common and simple is parsing an XML file
with the results of the tool. This makes it really easy to obtain the information. It
can happen, however, that the output XML file is malformed. When this happens,
normal parsers usually stop working and report an incorrect XML format. To avoid
this, another Python module has to be used. This module is called Beautiful soup,
and it gets all the data out of malformed XML files. It saves hours and hours of XML
fixing and it has been a great discovery.
Since each function will be different and will be related to the tool it parses, it makes
no sense designing them one by one. Everything is set up in order to make it easy to
incorporate new parsing functions into the system’s code. After pasting the new parsing
function at the end of the file, the name of the function has to be linked to the name of
the tool in the dictionary function that opens the file.
4.3.3 Monitor
The next step in the design of the system is the step where the audits are launched.
In order to do that, the system needs to gather the different tools from the database
and then use the Tool class to launch them. When each tool has finished, the parsing
function of that tool has to be used to parse the results and incorporate them into the
database. The part of the system that searches for the tools and overlooks their execu-
tions is called Monitor.
The Monitor has several functions to perform each step of the penetration testing pro-
cess. These functions will first gather all the tools that are assigned to the current phase,
and then will populate a Tool instance with each one of them. Once the Tool instance
has been filled, it is launched. When the tool finishes its execution, the function has
to obtain the parsing function of the tool and use it with the output of the tool. This
output could simply be the string that the pexpect module returns or the XML file gen-
erated by the tool.
When the tool has finished its execution and its output has been parsed, the monitor
has to update the progress of the audit.
Having a function for each step helps in customizing how the step has to be. For exam-
ple, in the information gathering phase the tools find information about machines on
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the system. This machines have to be analysed as well in the same phase. The design
of the information gathering phase is the following. First, all the tools are run with the
target of the audit as target. Once all tools have been run, the database is filled with
new machines. This machines have to be analysed again with some of the tools that
have already been used. The best example of such a tool is Nmap, because it will help
discover the operating system of each machine and the open ports and services residing
on them.
The execution time of certain security tools can be really long. That is why the monitor
tasks have been decoupled from the part of the system which calls them. This way,
when a user runs an audit, s/he does not need to wait until the audit has finished to
continue exploring the system or preparing a new audit. This has been accomplished
with Celery.
Celery is an asynchronous task queue based on distributed message passing. This task
queue uses a broker to pass messages between the tasks it launches. It supports multiple
brokers, but the recommended one and the used on this system is RabbitMQ.
Celery is a really easy system to use and set up, and it does not add any coding com-
plexity to the system. It is really easy to use it and calling it from the web interface
is like calling a normal function. Since the results of each phase of the penetration
testing process are stored in the database, the system does not even need to control the
returning results.
4.3.4 Web Interface
At first, the web interface was intended to only show the results of the system, by
interactively showing the contents of the database. Since certain Python libraries were
found which made writing web interfaces really easy, the scope of the web interface
changed a little bit.
Now, the web interface controls all the system, not only providing the results in an
interactive way, but allowing the user to create and run audits from it. This comes in
handy in the sense that managing users, networks and audits is really easier with a web
interface than with command line tools.
As has been said before, the web interface will be created with a Python module called
Flask, which is a microframework for web development, which incorporates Jinja 2 as
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a templating engine. Flask is also really easy to set up and use, and the template engine
is intuitive and simple.
The web interface starts with a log in screen, with the option of registering new users.
Once the user has logged in, a list with all the networks present on the system is shown.
It also gives the opportunity to create new networks. When a network is selected the
audits performed in that network are listed, and the option to create new ones is present
as well. The user can create new audits or display/redo old ones. When an audit is
selected, the user can choose to run it, be it as a whole or phase by phase, or to display
its findings.
The results of the audit are separated in two main blocks, the first block contains all
the user information found, the usernames and email addresses. The second block is
the important one, which shows all the machines found in the system. The information
gathered from the machines will be present as well. If any known vulnerabilities exist
that are related to the CPE of that machine, a link will be provided with information
from the Altair database. When a machine is selected, all the ports found by Nmap are
displayed. If any of those ports has vulnerabilities assigned to it, a link will be available.
Following that link will take the user to the vulnerabilities discovered from a certain
port. Each vulnerability will be listed and a link to the official site will be provided if
possible. This links will redirect to OSVDB or CVE vulnerability system’s websites.
4.4 Implementation
In this section the details of the implementation of the system will be listed, along with
any implementation decisions and assumptions made.
4.4.1 Data model
As it has been said in the design section, to control the system’s database the Python’s
module peewee is used. All the code below is stored in a python file named db.py. The
first thing needed to work with peewee is to create the connection with the database.
In order to do this, the database needs to be previously created, and a MySQLDatabase
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object needs to be instantiated.
db = MySQLDatabase(’PTAS’, user=’ptas’)
Once the creation of the database has been done, peewee needs to create models for each
table on the database. Each model will need the database assignation inside it as a Meta
class. This is why it is recommended to create a Base model first, and then use it with
all the other models. The only purpose of this Base model is to link the database to all
the models.
class BaseModel(peewee.Model ):
class Meta:
database = db
Once this base model has been created, all the other models can be created inheriting
the BaseModel. Each model will be a Python class and a MySQL table in the database.
Peewee makes it trivial to create the classes and it lets the coder easily establish foreign
key relations. A good example to show all this is the Audit class, which has some at-
tributes and two foreign key relations.
class Audit(BaseModel ):
created = peewee.DateTimeField ()
target = peewee.CharField ()
current_phase = peewee.CharField(null=True)
progress = peewee.FloatField(null=True)
user = peewee.ForeignKeyField(User , related_name=’audits ’)
network = peewee.ForeignKeyField(Network , related_name=’audits ’)
As it can be seen in the code snippet, peewee lets the coder put a name to the inverse
relation of the foreign key. This means that from the other classes, in this case from
user and network, it will be really easy to find the related audits.
Peewee lets the coder not think in terms of MySQL queries, but instead in terms of
Python classes directly.
When all the models have been created, Peewee needs to create the tables on the
database. In order to do that, it provides a built-in function that automatically cre-
ates the table. In order to ease the process, a simple function that creates all the tables
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is provided. This function should only be used once, when setting up the system for the
first time.
def create_tables ():
User.create_table ()
Network.create_table ()
Audit.create_table ()
Employee.create_table ()
Machine.create_table ()
Port.create_table ()
Vulnerability.create_table ()
Phase.create_table ()
Action.create_table ()
The tools that have to be used by the system have to be stored on the database. To
do that, the tools are provided in text files. These text files, one per phase, contain the
name of the tool, the options used by the tool, whether the tool generates a file output
or not and whether the tool is active or passive, all separated by commas. There exists
a function that reads all the tools from these files and loads them into the database.
This makes adding new tools easier, since the only thing needed to do is adding the tool
to the correct text file with the specified format and then running the load actions()
function.
def load_actions ():
try:
ig = Phase.get(Phase.order == 1)
except Phase.DoesNotExist:
ig = Phase(name=’Information Gathering ’, order =1)
ig.save()
try:
va = Phase.get(Phase.order == 2)
except Phase.DoesNotExist:
va = Phase(name=’Vulnerability Assessment ’, order =2)
va.save()
try:
ex = Phase.get(Phase.order == 3)
except Phase.DoesNotExist:
ex = Phase(name=’Exploitation ’, order =3)
ex.save()
load_file(ig,’IGactions.back’)
load_file(va, ’VAactions.back’)
load_file(ex, ’EXactions.back’)
def load_file(phase , filename ):
f = open(filename ). readlines ()
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for line in f:
l = line.split(’,’)
try:
a = Action.get(Action.tool == l[0])
except Action.DoesNotExist:
a = Action(tool = l[0], options=l[1], fileOutput=l[2], active=l[3], phase=phase)
a.save()
With this, all the necessary steps towards the construction of the data model are done.
The only thing that still needs to be done is importing the database dump provided by
es-CERT. The first thing needed to be done is creating the database using the provided
dump file. Once the database has been created, a peewee model has to be created.
Luckily, peewee comes with a little script called pwiz. This script reads an existing
database and creates the skeleton code that it needs to interact with the said database.
Since the Altair database will be read-only, with the skeleton generated by pwiz will be
enough to work with it.
4.4.2 Tool Integration
As it has been said in the design section, a generic class that will be able to run all the
tools has to be created. This class is called Tool and will be stored in the file tool.py.
This class uses the Python module pexpect, and has some simple functions and the
function that runs the command line tool.
import pexpect
class Tool:
name = ""
options = ""
target = ""
output = ""
fileOutput = False
def run(self , timeout =20000):
if len(self.options) > 0:
launch = "sudo "+self.name + " " + self.options + " " + self.target
else:
launch = "sudo "+self.name + " " + self.target
log = open(’log.txt’,’w’)
child = pexpect.spawn(launch , timeout =20000 , maxread =20000 , logfile = log)
try:
child.expect("password for ptas:",timeout = 5)
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child.sendline("ptas")
child.expect(pexpect.EOF)
except pexpect.EOF:
pass
self.output = child.before
def setTarget(self , tar):
if self.options.find(’%target%’):
self.options = self.options.replace(’%target%’,tar)
else:
self.target = tar
def setFile(self , f):
if self.options.find(’%file%’):
self.options = self.options.replace(’%file%’,f)
def getResult(self):
return self.output
The simple functions setTarget and setFile search for the keywords and then replace
them with the received parameters. In the case of the target, if the keyword does not
exist, it appends the target at the end.
The more complex function is run, which first appends the name of the tool with the
options and the target and then runs it using the spawn function. This function creates
a child with whom it is possible to communicate. Since the launch string has the sudo
keyword in order to obtain root privileges, the function has to provide the password
when it is asked for. In order to do this the functions expect and send are used. The
first one waits until the standard output of the launched process matches the string
passed as argument, and the second one send the argument to the process as standard
input. Finally, the function has to wait until the process finishes. This is done with the
same expect function, but this time expecting the end of file special character. Once the
process has finished, the output is stored in a parameter of the class.
The timeout established in the run function has to be long enough to wait for slow
processes. For example, the tool named theHarvester, spends a lot of time running its
normal execution, and the default timeout for the spawn function would be not enough.
The other main part of tool integration are the parsing functions. Each function is
unique and aimed at a specific tool. All the parsing functions are stored in a file called
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parsers.py. This file also has a function that given the name of a tool returns the parser
of that tool.
def getParser(name):
return {
’dnsenum ’: parseDNSENUM ,
’nmap’: parseNMAP ,
’dnsrecon ’ : parseDNSRECON ,
’dmitry ’ : parseDMITRY ,
’theHarvester ’ : parseHARVESTER ,
’xprobe2 ’ : parseXPROBE ,
’wafw00f ’ :parseWAFW00F ,
’nikto’ : parseNIKTO ,
’metagoofil ’ : parseMETAGOOFIL ,
’wpscan ’ : parseWPSCAN
}.get(name ,None)
This function needs to be update each time a new parsing function is added to the file.
All functions are unique, but not all functions will be explained here, since most of them
are similar. Some examples will be described.
One of the best examples of an XML parsing function is the function that parses the tool
Nmap. It needs the ElementTree standard library, which is imported with the following
line.
import xml.etree.ElementTree as et
Since the parsing function of the Nmap tool is quite long, it will be explained by parts.
First of all, this function can accept an extra parameter, which is a machine. This means
that this function can be called with a machine that is already present on the system,
in which case the first part will be ignored. The first part is where Nmap identifies the
machine, as well as its operating system and its cpe.
def parseNMAP(resource , audit , machine=None):
tree = et.parse(resource)
root = tree.getroot ()
for host in root.findall(’host’):
if machine == None:
address = host.find(’address ’).get(’addr’)
try:
os = host.find(’os’)
match = os.find(’osmatch ’)
name = match.get(’name’)
cpe = match.find(’osclass ’).find(’cpe’).text
except Exception , e:
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print ’exception ’ , e
name = ’unknown ’
cpe = ’unknown ’
print cpe
try:
m = db.Machine.get((db.Machine.address == address )& (db.Machine.audit == audit ))
m.os = name
m.cpe = cpe
m.save()
print ’update machine ’
except db.Machine.DoesNotExist:
m = db.Machine(address=address , name = address , audit = audit , os=name , cpe=cpe)
m.save()
else:
m = machine
As it can be seen in the code above, all the function is wrapped inside a for loop. This
is so because Nmap can scan an entire network and find multiple machines on it. For
eache machine Nmap finds, the function gets the address, the operating system and the
cpe. Then it looks into the database in order to find out if the machine already exists
on the system, and if it exists, the function updates the machine with the operating
system and the cpe. If the machine does not exists, the function creates the machine
with all the information it has gathered. If a machine has been provided, it simply
assigns the provided machine to the m variable, which will be used in the second part
of the function.
The second part of the function is still inside the for loop.
ports = host.find(’ports’)
for port in ports.findall(’port’):
number = port.get(’portid ’)
service = port.find(’service ’).get(’name’)
state = port.find(’state’).get(’state’)
try:
product = port.find(’service ’).get(’product ’)
cpe = port.find(’cpe’)
except Exception , e:
product = None
cpe = None
try:
p = db.Port.get((db.Port.machine == m) & (db.Port.number == number) & (db.Port.service == service) & (db.Port.state == state))
except db.Port.DoesNotExist:
p = db.Port(machine=m, number=number , service=service , state=state , product=product , cpe=cpe)
p.save()
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In this second part, the function looks for all the ports found by Nmap in the host that
is currently analysing. For each port, if finds its number, the service that was listening
to that port and its state. Then, if it exists, it gets the product fingerprinted by Nmap
and its cpe. Once it has all the information, it searches the database for that exact port,
and if it does not exist, proceeds to create it.
It can happen that some tools provide as output an HTML file that is not correctly well
formed. In this case, using the Python standard parser would not be possible. If the
ElementTree parser gets a malformed XML, it raises an exception. In order to avoid
that, a Python module named Beautiful Soup can be used. This module accepts
malformed XML files and tries to get all the information it can from them. In the
system, this happened with two tools, Metagoofil and theHarvester.
The parsing function of the tool theHarvester is the following one.
def parseHARVESTER(resource ,audit ):
f = open(resource)
soup = BeautifulSoup(f)
for tag in soup.find_all(’ul’):
print tag.get(’class’)[0]
if tag[’class’][0] == "userslist":
for elem in tag.find_all(’li’):
try:
e = db.Employee.get((db.Employee.email== elem.string) & (db.Employee.audit==audit ))
except db.Employee.DoesNotExist:
e = db.Employee(email = elem.string , audit = audit)
e.save()
print elem.string
if tag[’class’][0] == "pathslist":
for elem in tag.find_all(’li’):
aux = elem.string
aux = aux.split(’:’)
address = aux[0]
name = aux[1]
try:
m = db.Machine.get((db.Machine.address == address) & (db.Machine.name==name) & (db.Machine.audit == audit))
except db.Machine.DoesNotExist:
m = db.Machine(address=address , name=name , audit=audit)
m.save()
As it can be seen in the function, using the Beautiful soup module is really simple. First
of all, it reads the file with its custom parser and return a tree-like variable than can be
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easily queried. In this concrete example we see that the function gets email addresses
and creates Employees, and then gets virtual hosts and creates Machines with them.
The third possibility is that a tool does not provide a file output or that it provides a
file output but not in a parsable format. In this case, the parsing function has to play
with Strings and with the find() function provided by Python. A simple example is the
tool called Wafw00f, which does not provide a file output. The parsing function is the
following one.
def parseWAFW00F(resource , audit , machine=None):
aux = resource.find(’Checking ’)
output = resource[aux:]
tar_end = output.find(’\n’)
target = output [9: tar_end]
result = ’No WAF’
lines = output.split(’\n’)
for line in lines:
if line.find(’The site’) >= 0:
l = len(target) + 9
result = line[l:]
if machine != None:
machine.waf = result
machine.save()
print result
This type of outputs require some creative string manipulation in order to obtain the
part of the output that can be stored in the database. The usage of the find() function
is a must, and playing with String delimiters also helps in obtaining the interesting bits.
This three types of output cover all the different outputs found in the tools used by
the system. If a future user wants to add a new tool, a new parsing function has to
be created, that correctly parses the output of the desired tool and transforms it into
information in the system’s data model.
4.4.3 Monitor
In order to launch tools, the Monitor needs to retrieve those tools from the database
and create Tool classes for each of them. This work is done in a file called monitor.py.
This file has the function that will be launched when an audit starts. This function will
be launched with the asynchronous task queue manager called Celery. This is why the
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first thing needed is to import the module that controls it, and then to create a Celery
instance with the desired broker. This is done with the following lines of code.
from celery import Celery
app = Celery(’tasks ’, broker=’amqp :// guest@localhost //’)
The only thing needed now for Celery to work is to register the functions we want to be
called with this system. This is done by simply adding @app.task before the definition
of the functions we want to register. In this case, for simplicity, only one function will
be registered. This function will receive a list which will tell it which phases have to be
executed. This function is the following one.
@app.task
def launch(audit_id , l):
if "1" in l:
runIG(audit_id)
if "2" in l:
runVA(audit_id)
if "3" in l:
runEX(audit_id)
audit = db.Audit.get(db.Audit.id == audit_id)
audit.current_phase = None
audit.save()
As it can be seen, it receives a list and then launches the appropriate functions that
represent each phase of the penetration testing process.
The first function to be explained will be the function that represents the Information
Gathering phase. This function is a long one because it first scans all the tools and
then scans some of them again targeting the new machines found previously. In order
to make it more understandable, an auxiliary function has been created that gets all
the parameters of an Action from the database and assigns them to a Tool instance and
then runs it. The function is the following.
def run(action , audit):
t = tool.Tool()
t.name = action.tool
t.options = action.options
t.setTarget(audit.target)
t.fileOutput = action.fileOutput
parser = parsers.getParser(t.name)
fileName = "%s.xml" % t.name
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try:
t.run()
if t.fileOutput:
parser(fileName , audit)
os.remove(fileName)
else:
parser(t.getResult (), audit)
except Exception , e:
pass
print t.name , ’done’
This auxiliary function runs the Tool instance and then searches for the parser and uses
it to parse the output of the function. If the function has generated a file output it tries
to remove it after it has been parsed.
The Information Gathering function has two differentiated parts. In the first one it runs
all the available tools assigning as target the target of the audit. This first part is the
one that uses the auxiliary function described above.
def runIG(audit_id ):
audit = db.Audit.get(db.Audit.id == audit_id)
q = db.Action.select (). join(db.Phase).where(db.Phase.order == 1)
audit.current_phase = ’Information Gathering ’
audit.progress = 0
total = q.count()
cont = 0
audit.save()
for a in q:
run(a, audit)
cont +=1
p = float(cont) / total
audit.progress = p
audit.save()
print ’second step’
As it can be seen above, the progress is separated for the two parts of the function since
it is impossible to know beforehand how many machines will the process find. Apart
from this clarification, the rest of this part of the function is trivial, retrieving all the
Actions from the database and running them one by one.
The second part is longer because the auxiliary function cannot be used as is.
print ’second step’
machines = db.Machine.select (). join(db.Audit). where(db.Audit.id == audit_id)
total += machines.count ()*3
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nmap = db.Action.get(db.Action.tool == ’nmap’)
xprobe = db.Action.get(db.Action.tool == ’xprobe2 ’)
waf = db.Action.get(db.Action.tool == ’wafw00f ’)
unitools = [nmap ,xprobe ,waf]
for m in machines:
print m.address
for action in unitools:
t = tool.Tool()
t.name = action.tool
t.options = action.options
t.target = m.address
t.fileOutput = action.fileOutput
parser = parsers.getParser(t.name)
fileName = "%s.xml" % t.name
try:
t.run()
if t.fileOutput:
parser(fileName , audit , m)
os.remove(fileName)
else:
parser(t.getResult (), audit , m)
except Exception , e:
pass
cont +=1
p = float(cont) / total
audit.progress = p
audit.save()
print ’machine finished ’
In this part of the function the first thing needed to be done is retrieving all the machines
that the process has found. After getting them, the three tools that will be used have to
be gathered as well. It can be noted that the progress total is updated with the number
of machines times 3.
After getting the machines and the tools, each tool has to be executed for each machine.
In order to do that, a Tool instance is created for each of them, and then executed. When
it has been completed, the parser is used with the difference that now the machine that
the tools are analysing is passed as a parameter. After each parser finishes, the progress
is updated.
The second phase of the penetration testing process is the Vulnerability Assessment
phase. In this phase, the system is checked for vulnerabilities on its services. In this
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project, only HTTP vulnerability scanners have been used. This means that the function
will have to run all the tools through all the ports that have HTTP as a service.
def runVA(audit_id ):
audit = db.Audit.get(db.Audit.id == audit_id)
q = db.Action.select (). join(db.Phase).where(db.Phase.order == 2)
p = db.Port.select (). join(db.Machine ).join(db.Audit).where ((db.Audit.id == audit_id) & (db.Port.service == ’http’))
audit.current_phase = ’Vulnerability Assessment ’
audit.progress = 0
cont = 0
audit.save()
for port in p:
for action in q:
cont +=1
addr = port.machine.address
t = tool.Tool()
t.name = action.tool
t.options = action.options
if action.options.find(’%port%’):
t.options = t.options.replace(’%port%’,str(port.number ))
t.setTarget(addr)
t.fileOutput = action.fileOutput
fileName = "%s.xml" % t.name
if t.name == ’nikto’:
fileName = "%(name)s%( address)s%(port)s.xml" % {’name’:t.name , ’address ’: addr , ’port’: port.number}
t.setFile(fileName)
print t.options
parser = parsers.getParser(t.name)
try:
t.run()
if t.fileOutput:
parser(fileName , port)
os.remove(fileName)
else:
parser(t.getResult (), port)
except Exception , e:
pass
print t.name , ’done’
pro = float(cont) / p.count()
audit.progress = pro
audit.save()
This function is really similar to the other one, with the difference that now the targets
are the ports found in the previous phase. Here only the ports that run HTTP servers
are selected, but if tools that scan other services are added, other services can be selected
as well. For the rest of the function there is no big differences. A small clarification
Chapter 4. Design & Implementation 74
would be necessary for the fileName construction. It is purely for debugging purposes
and it was not changed.
The third phase that the system runs is the Exploitation phase. In this phase only the
Metasploit console is used. This is why the following function is so simple. It also uses
the run() function described previously.
def runEX(audit_id ):
audit = db.Audit.get(db.Audit.id == audit_id)
q = db.Action.get(db.Action.tool == ’msfconsole ’)
audit.current_phase = ’Exploitation ’
audit.progress = 0
cont = 0
audit.save()
run(q, audit)
cont +=1
p = 1
audit.progress = p
audit.save()
With this function the Monitor ends. All the tools present on the system are used and
parsed. In the case more tools are added to the system, the Monitor could not need to
be updated, since it gets the tools from the database as a whole.
4.4.4 Web Interface
The web interface is the visible part of the system. As it has been said before, the web
interface will not only show the results, but will also control the system.
In order to do that, an API has been created with Flask and stored in a file named web.py,
and then a series of templates have been coded with the Jinja 2 template engine. The
API will be detailed now, as well as the results of the templates.
First of all, a Flask app has to be created. This app will be used to specify the routes
that the API will accept. Also, this app is the one that has to be run in order to start
the web server.
app = Flask(__name__)
app.secret_key = ’some_secret ’
[...]
if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
app.run(host=’0.0.0.0 ’)
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Those four lines of code are the base for constructing the web server. The first two lines
are at the beginning of the file and the last are at the end.
So, one of the first things the system needs is user management. Since this system is
not intended to be deployed on the Internet, the user management is really simple.
First, we have an API function to register users. This function is called register().
@app.route(’/register ’, methods =[’GET’, ’POST’])
def register ():
if request.method == ’POST’ and request.form[’username ’]:
username = request.form[’username ’]
password = request.form[’password ’]
try:
u = db.User.get(username=username)
flash(’Username already in use’)
except db.User.DoesNotExist:
user = db.User(username=username , password=password , email = request.form[’email ’])
user.save()
auth_user(user)
return redirect(’/’)
return render_template(’register.html’)
This brief function shows how Flask works. The line above the function declaration
states the route needed to follow to get to the register function. It also states the
methods allowed when asking for this resource. The first line inside the function is the
one that separates the behaviour depending on the method used to access it. If the
method is GET, then the function’s sole objective is to render the HTML page with the
registration form. If the method is POST, it means that the registration form has been
filled, and that a new user has to be created. Here, the function asks for the username
and the password chosen. If there is another user with the same username, it flashes an
error message saying that the name chosen is already in use. If a user does not exist, it
is created, authenticated and redirected to the homepage.
If a user already has a username and password, s/he can login into the system using the
login page. The login page is linked to the login function, which is really similar to the
register one. The function is the following.
@app.route(’/login ’, methods =[’GET’, ’POST’])
def login ():
if request.method == ’POST’ and request.form[’username ’]:
try:
user = db.User.get(
username=request.form[’username ’],
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Figure 4.8: Register form
password=request.form[’password ’]
)
except db.User.DoesNotExist:
flash(’The password entered is incorrect ’)
else:
auth_user(user)
return redirect(’/’)
return render_template(’login.html’)
The main difference here is that if the user does not exist an incorrect password message
is flashed. When the user is checked, the function auth user() authenticates him/her.
This function creates a session with information about the user. All the functionalities
of the system require a logged user in order to work. This is why a function has been
created in order to check whether a user is logged in or not. This function will then be
used whenever a user is required to be logged in.
def auth_user(user):
session[’logged_in ’] = True
session[’userID ’] = user.id
session[’username ’] = user.username
flash(’You are logged in as %s’ % (user.username ))
def login_required(f):
@wraps(f)
def inner(*args , ** kwargs ):
if not session.get(’logged_in ’):
return redirect(url_for(’login ’))
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return f(*args , ** kwargs)
return inner
Figure 4.9: Login page
When a user is logged in, the first thing s/he sees is the Network list. This screen shows
all the networks present on the database, and allows the user to create new ones. In
the case no networks are present on the system, it automatically redirects to the screen
where the user can create a new one.
@app.route("/networks")
@login_required
def networks ():
networks = db.Network.select ()
if networks.count() == 0:
return redirect(url_for(’createNetwork ’))
else:
return object_list("network_list.html", networks , "network_list")
When the user selects a network, the systems shows the name of the audit and the user
that created it, and offers two links, one to create an audit and another one to show all
the audits of that network.
When the user chooses the See Audits button, the system shows the list of audits that
have been performed in that network. The function that renders the list of audits is
almost exactly the same as the networks one.
When creating an audit, the target that the user wants to attack has to be specified. The
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Figure 4.10: Network List
following function is the one that covers this functionality. The function that creates a
Network is almost the same.
@app.route("/createAudit/<int:network_id >", methods =[’GET’,’POST’])
@login_required
def create_audit(network_id ):
if request.method == ’POST’ and request.form[’target ’]:
try:
net = get_object_or_404(db.Network , id=request.form[’network ’])
user = db.User.get(db.User.id == session[’userID ’])
aud = db.Audit.create(
target=request.form[’target ’],
created=datetime.datetime.now(),
current_phase=None ,
progress=0,
user = user ,
network = net
)
aud.save()
return redirect(url_for(’audit_detail ’,audit_id=aud.id))
except Exception , e:
raise e
net = get_object_or_404(db.Network , id=network_id)
return render_template(’create_audit.html’, network=net)
It can be seen in this function that the route now accepts a parameter. The coder
can specify the type of the parameter for easier usage. This parameter then needs to
be specified in the function declaration as well. This function also has the method
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separation in order to render the form and to accept its result. When accepting the
result of the form via POST method, the first thing it needs to do is to get the network
and the user. If the network does not exist, a 404 message is displayed using the
get object or 404() function. When all the information is gathered, an audit is created
and saved into the database. It finishes by redirecting the user to the audit detail page.
Figure 4.11: Audit detail before launching
The audit detail page is where the system launches the penetration testing process. This
page is rendered by a function that again accepts both GET and POST methods.
@app.route("/audit/<int:audit_id >", methods =[’GET’, ’POST’])
@login_required
def audit_detail(audit_id ):
if request.method == ’POST’:
try:
x = request.form.getlist(’phase’)
monitor.launch.delay(audit_id ,x)
return redirect(url_for("audit_detail", audit_id=audit_id ))
except Exception , e:
raise e
audit = get_object_or_404(db.Audit , id=audit_id)
return render_template("audit_detail.html", audit=audit)
In this function, the system only receives a list from the form. This list represents the
checkboxes displayed on the audit detail page. This same list is the one that has to be
passed to the launch() function in the monitor. This function call is done using Celery.
In order to do that, a Celery function called delay() is used. This function puts the task
into the asynchronous task queue. Since this system is asynchronous, the function does
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not need to wait for the function to end, and can continue by redirecting the user to
the same page. This could seem a little bit idiotic, but when the penetration testing is
started, the audit detail screen changes to show the progress of the audit.
Figure 4.12: Audit detail after launching
When the penetration testing process has finished, the screen goes back to its original
state, and the tester can check if any results have been added to the database.
The first thing the tester can check is if any username or email address has been found.
This is done by a simple function that gathers all the employees related to the current
audit.
Figure 4.13: Employee list
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The more interesting part of the results is the list of machines found by the penetration
testing process. This page shows all the machines found by the system, and if the
user clicks any machine, its characteristics and the ports found on it are displayed in
a collapsible format. The function that renders this page is a really simple one. The
interesting thing here is that peewee is able to traverse the database using the relations
between tables. This means that only providing the machines to the template is enough
to render both the machines and their ports. The template of this page will be shown
as a good example of both the templating engine and this interesting peewee feature.
{% extends ” layout . html” %}
{% block body %}
<h2>Machines</h2>
<ul>
{% fo r machine in mach in e l i s t %}
<div class=’panel−group ’ id=’accordion ’>
<div class=’panel panel−de fau l t ’>
<div class=’panel−heading ’>
<h4 class=’panel−t i t l e ’>
<a data−t ogg l e=’ co l l ap s e ’ data−parent=’#accordion ’ href=”#c o l l {{machine . id }}”>
{% pr in t machine . name ˜ ” ( ” ˜ machine . address ˜ ” ) ” %}
</a>
</h4>
</div>
<div id=’ c o l l {{machine . id }} ’ class=’panel−c o l l a p s e co l l ap s e ’>
<div class=’panel−body ’>
<div>Name : {{machine . name}}</div>
<div>Address : {{machine . address }}</div>
<div>OS: {{machine . os}}</div>
<div>Behind a Web Appl i cat ion F i r ewa l l ? : {{machine . waf}}</div>
<div>CPE: {{machine . cpe}} <a href=”{{ u r l f o r ( ’ cpe vu l s ’ , cpe=machine . cpe )}}”>Pos s i b l e v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s</a></div>
<br>
<div class=’panel panel−de fau l t ’>
<table class=’table ’>
<tr>
<th>Port number</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Se rv i c e</th>
<th>Product</th>
</ tr>
{% fo r port in machine . por t s %}
<tr>
{% i f port . v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s . count ( ) > 0 %}
<td><a href=”{{ u r l f o r ( ’ p o r t d e t a i l ’ , p o r t i d=port . id )}}”>{{port . number}}</a></td>
{% e l s e %}
<td>{{port . number}}</td>
{% end i f %}
<td>{{port . s t a t e }}</td>
<td>{{port . s e r v i c e }}</td>
{% i f port . product %}
<td>{{port . product}}</td>
{% e l s e %}
<td>Unknown</td>
{% end i f %}
</ tr>
{% endfor %}
</ table>
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</div>
</div>
</div>
</ l i>
</div>
</div>
{% endfor %}
</ul>
<div>
<a href=”{{ u r l f o r ( ’ a ud i t d e t a i l ’ , a ud i t i d=aud i t i d )}}”>Go Back</a>
</div>
{% endblock %}
This HTML file starts by extending another one, called layout.html, that establishes a
base for all the other files on the system, creating a unified view on all of them.
The first interesting thing that can be seen is the usage of a for loop inside the HTML
code. Jinja uses the keywords {% %} to execute Python code inside HTML files. In this
concrete case this is used to iterate over the list of machines passed by the machines()
function defined in web.py.
Inside each machine, after the collapse feature code, the operating system, the web
application framework and cpe of that machine can be seen. If the machine has a
cpe that is present in the Altair database, a link to the known vulnerabilities will be
provided. After this information, a table with all the ports discovered is presented. This
can be done thanks to the peewee feature that was commented before. This feature
allows to iterate over the ports of each machine with this simple line of code.
{% for port in machine.ports %}
Inside the port loop, all the characteristics of the port are listed in a table layout. If a
port has been scanned for vulnerabilities and some vulnerabilities have been found, a
link is provided in order to inspect this vulnerabilities.
This HTML file is one of the more complete and complex ones. This shows how powerful
and simple the Jinja template engine is in conjunction with Flask.
When a user selects a port with vulnerabilities, the port detail page is showed. This
page shows all the vulnerabilities found by the penetration testing process in a table
layout. For each vulnerability the OSVDB id is provided, as well as a brief description
and the link provided by the vulnerability scanner. If the vulnerability is stored in the
Altair database, a link is provided that leads to the information of that vulnerability in
the Altair database. The function that provides this functionality is the following one.
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Figure 4.14: Machine List
@app.route("/port/<int:port_id >")
@login_required
def port_detail(port_id ):
port = get_object_or_404(db.Port , id=port_id)
vuls = port.vulnerabilities
for vul in vuls:
try:
aux = altair.Osvdb.get(altair.Osvdb.code==vul.osvdb)
vul.os = aux
except altair.Osvdb.DoesNotExist:
pass
except Exception , e:
raise e
return render_template("port_detail.html",port=port , vulnerabilities=vuls)
Lastly, it has been said before that if Altair has vulnerabilities related to a cpe, a link
will be provided in the machine detailed information. This link will lead to a table with
all the known vulnerabilities, sorted by risk, and with some description and solutions
about each one of them. This functionality is provided by the following piece of code.
@app.route("/machine/vul/<path:cpe >")
@login_required
def cpe_vuls(cpe):
if cpe != ’unknown ’:
aux = "%"+cpe+"%"
vuls = altair.Vulnera.select (). where(altair.Vulnera.plat_afectadas % aux). order_by(SQL(" FIELD(Riesgo , ’Muy Alto ’, ’Alto ’,’Medio ’,’Bajo ’) "))
ma = vuls.select (). where(altair.Vulnera.riesgo == ’Muy Alto’). count()
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Figure 4.15: Port detail
a = vuls.select (). where(altair.Vulnera.riesgo == ’Alto’).count()
m = vuls.select (). where(altair.Vulnera.riesgo == ’Medio ’).count()
b = vuls.select (). where(altair.Vulnera.riesgo == ’Bajo’).count()
scores = {’ma’:ma, ’a’:a,’m’:m,’b’:b}
else:
vuls=None
scores=None
return render_template(’altair_vuls.html’, vuls = vuls , cpe=cpe , scores =scores)
It can be noted that in this function the database that is accessed is a different one. In
this case, the database is from Altair, and the file altair.py is the one containing the
peewee models for this database. Some counts are done in order to provide a summary
table with the total number of vulnerabilities found.
4.5 Deployment
The system built in this project has a lot of dependencies. Deploying it is not as easy
as getting the source code and executing it. Apart from the direct dependencies of the
code, all the tools that have to be used need to be installed on the host system. This is
a lot of work since not all tools are easy to install.
In order to solve this problem, or setback, an alternative is being provided. This alter-
native consists on a virtual machine with the system previously installed on it.
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Figure 4.16: Altair vulnerabilities
The chosen virtual machine is an Ubuntu Server. This choice is motivated by the fact
that since the system does not have a common graphical interface, it does not need an
Operating System with graphical interface. Instead, the choice of a server like distribu-
tion motivates the fact that the system is a small web server.
Using this setup, the user can mount the Ubuntu Server with the system on a virtual
machine, and access the system through a browser.
The creation process of the custom Ubuntu Server is the following.
First of all, a clean Ubuntu Server distribution is downloaded from the official source
the usand run inside a virtual machine. The next step is placing the source code of the
system on the virtual machine. The next step would be configuring the source code to
match it with the usernames and passwords presents on the system, since it needs a user
to access the database and a user and password to run tools with root privileges. The
following step would be installing all the code dependencies. The dependencies are most
of them Python libraries, which makes them easy to install. However, there are quite a
few, and will be listed now.
• Peewee
• Pexpect
• Celery
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• RabbitMQ
• Flask
• Beautiful Soup
• MySQLDb
Once all the code dependencies are solved, the next step is installing all the tools that
the system has to use. If a user would like to add new tools, s/he would need to install
them first. An easy solution to this problem would be using a distribution that already
had all this tools pre-installed on them, like Kali Linux, but this would condition the
usage of the virtual machine. Choosing a server-like distro instead gives the user the
possibility of using the virtual machine for other things than only using the penetration
testing system.
Installing the tools in the operating system can be challenging, since most of them
are not in official repositories. This means that the source code of the tool has to be
downloaded from one of the known sources and then the dependencies of each tool have
to be resolved manually.
Once all the tools are installed on the virtual machine, the system is almost ready to run.
In order to be able to run the system on an operating system without graphical interface
a script has been created that runs the necessary tools that need to run concurrently to
the web server. Running this script and accessing the server via a web browser would
be the last step to start using the system.
All this process has already been done and the virtual machine has been created. To-
gether with the source code of the system, a virtual machine disk image will be provided.
This disk image can be opened with any virtualisation software and the system tried
out. In the image provided the pre-established user names and passwords will be ptas.
Chapter 5
Test Cases
The system has been used in two different scenarios, in order to demonstrate all parts
of the system.
The first scenario is a virtual machine with the vulnerable Metasploitable distribution.
This test case aims to demonstrate that the system can discover and list vulnerabilities.
To do that a distribution with known vulnerabilities has been chosen, to make sure that
there are some vulnerabilities to find.
The second scenario has been chosen to demonstrate a part of the system that cannot be
tested with the first scenario. The scenario chosen is the Renfe website.This scenario
will let the system discover multiple machines and information about the employees at
Renfe, since this website has lots of documents online, and one of the tools used on the
system uses web engines to find these documents.
5.1 Test Case 1 - Metasploitable
Metaspoitable is a vulnerable VMware virtual machine built be the Metasploit team.
It is intended for trying exploitation frameworks in a safe and legal environment. This
virtual machine contains a Linux system with several vulnerabilities and it can be used
to test our system.
First of all, a virtual machine has to be set up with Metasploitable. Once it is set up, the
system can start analysing it. The first step is to create a Network for Metasploitable,
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and to create an Audit with the IP of the virtual machine containing Metasploitable as
target. Once this is done, the penetration testing can begin.
Once the testing ends, the results can be analysed. First of all, the employees section
should be empty, since the address used is a private address and there’s no resources
directly associated with the virtual machine in our test case. However, since theHarvester
searches the internet in order to find email addresses, it could happen that the system
finds email addresses that end with the target. This email addresses are not valid ones,
but garbage found on the Internet.
Then, the important results on this test case are in the machines section. Here, the
Figure 5.1: Employees - Metasploitable
system correctly identifies a single machine, and if the machine is selected, a list of
open ports can be explored. Together with the open ports, it can be seen that the
system has correctly obtained the Operating System and its CPE, and some known
vulnerabilities from the Altair database can be obtained using the CPE. As it can be
seen, the Metasploitable machine has several open ports, and probably most of them
have some vulnerabilities. In our case, the system scans all HTTP ports with Nikto in
order to find vulnerabilities in the web servers listening on those ports. In this test case
it can be seen that there are two web servers with some vulnerabilities. If we access
one of this ports, the vulnerabilities found by Nikto will be displayed. This test case
demonstrates that the system works up until the second stage of the penetration testing
process.
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Figure 5.2: Machines - Metasploitable
Figure 5.3: Vulnerabilities - Metasploitable
Regarding the third stage of the process, the Metasploit module db autopwn has been
used on the Metasploitable virtual machine and it has been unsuccessful. This means
that the module is not as useful as it seemed at the beginning, since it cannot even
find vulnerabilities in a system that has been built in order to have lots of them. This
means that both the intelligent exploitation and the automatic exploitation using the
db autopwn module are not possible on this system.
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5.2 Test Case 2 - Renfe.com
This second test case is thought to assess whether the first stage of the penetration
testing process is correctly done by the system. In order to demonstrate it, an actual
web site will be used. In this case, the chosen web site is the web site from the Spanish
railway company called Renfe. Since this is a public web site and we do not have per-
mission to perform a complete penetration testing on it, performing it would be illegal.
That is why only the first stage of the penetration testing process will be done in this
test case.
After setting up the system creating the Network and the Audit, the Information Gath-
ering phase is launched against www.renfe.com.
Once the audit has finished working, the results can be analysed.
First of all, the Employees section. In this test case it can be seen that several usernames
and email addresses have been found. This is so because the website chosen to do the
test case publishes lots of documents on the internet. This is why the metadata extractor
is able to obtain so many different usernames.
Figure 5.4: Employees - Renfe
The usernames could be used by a cybercriminal, together with the email addresses, to
perform a Social Engineering attack. The usernames could also be used to perform a
bruteforce attack on the administrative interface of the website. Usually, this kind of
information leakage is disregarded as important, since at first sight does not seem that
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dangerous. However, one of the easiest and most common ways to attack a system is
through its weakest link, the user behind it, and a Social Engineering attack aims at
attacking this link. Studies show that Social Engineering attacks are faster and more
efficient than highly technological ones. This is an important thing to have in mind when
performing an audit, and it should be included in the report handed to the company.
The next thing that can be explored in this test case is the machines found. In this case
lots of machines have been found. This is so because this is an actual website, and the
system will find DNS machines, virtual hosts, and machines related to the target.
We can see in the image that some of the machines found have been positively finger-
Figure 5.5: Machines - Renfe
printed, and the operating system and the Web Application Firewall they use have been
identified. Also the open ports on the machines have been identified, and since they are
machines exposed to the Internet, they have a much lower number of ports, if compared
with the Metasploitable machine.
Chapter 6
Final Analysis
Once the project has been finished, the system built and tested, it is now time to do
some conclusions over the work done, and some possible future work.
First, the problems found during the project will be explained, and how where they
solved, then an economical analysis of the cost of the project will be done, followed by
the conclusions extracted from building the system. After that, some possible future
lines of work will be described, in order to improve the work already done, and the
knowledge gained by doing this project will be also specified.
6.1 Technical Problems
When building the system described in this project, several problems where detected.
The first problem that was detected, while researching about automating tools, was that
intelligently automatizing the exploitation and post-exploitation phases of the penetra-
tion testing process was a really difficult task. No APIs are available to help solving
this problem and no other security framework was doing it at the moment. There were
frameworks that launched lots and lots of different exploits, hoping that one of them
worked, but there was not enough time in the project’s lifespan to accomplish that.
This problem was a major one, since it reduced the effectiveness of the system. How-
ever, since no other framework studied accomplished that, it was decided that the system
would center itself on the first stages of the penetration testing process instead.
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Another major problem found during the analysis and design phases of the project was
the amount of security tools available. There are lots and lots of tools out there, and
to build a complete framework, most of them should be used. At least all the aspects
of each phase should be covered, but this is again a really harsh job. Performing a
penetration test is not an exact science, and even though there are really good guides,
it depends a lot on the knowledge and creativity of the tester. Moreover, since everyday
new vulnerabilities are found, and new technologies are created, the tools whose aim is
to protect and secure these technologies need to be updated constantly. And of course,
if a new technology is created, a new security tool that scans this technology has to
be created. This means that creating the definitive scanning framework is impossible,
it has to be update continuously. Due to the amount of security tools available and
the fact that a complete framework should be constantly updated, a few tools where
selected to represent each stage of the penetration testing process. This may give the
impression that the system has few tools, but finding a new tool, learning how the tool
works properly and then building a parsing function for that tool is a time-consuming
task.
Finally, the fact that a clear standard for vulnerabilities does not exist was also a prob-
lem. Since different tools use different enumeration systems and establishing a relation-
ship between them is really complex, classifying vulnerabilities in a correct and simple
way was nearly impossible. In this project, this problem has been solved by using the
OSVDB system, since it is the system used by the two vulnerability assessment tools
used by the system. If new tools are added that do not use the OSVDB system, and
instead use the CVE one, the project’s system will only need some minor modifications
to correctly work with the new system.
6.2 Economical Analysis
This project lasted for 6 months. Two major roles can be defined here, since the project
is separated in two differentiate parts. The first part would be all the research done, and
the analysis and design of the system. The second part would be the implementation
and testing. The initial planning of the project was followed, meaning that the first part
lasted for 2 months and the second part was 4 months long.
The first part should have been done by a security analyst, since it is a really focused
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work, with a really big stress on security.
The second part could be done by a junior Python developer because the design is pro-
vided, as well as the tools that need to be used and the database model of the system.
• Security Analyst
– 250 hours
– 35 AC / hour
– 8750 AC
• Junior Python Developer
– 500 hours
– 15 AC / hour
– 7500 AC
This project did not need any special hardware components, nor any software license.
The system could be executed with any desktop computer. This fact makes the project
budget’s only factor the salary of the developer and the analyst. Both salaries combined
would make the budget for the project be 16250 AC.
6.3 Future Work
The development of this project has finished, but the system is not as perfect as it could
be. There are some improvements that could be done, that would make the system even
more interesting. Some of them will be listed now.
First of all, the most important thing this project needs and deserves is to widen the tool
set. The tools chosen for this project are a representative and sufficient set for showing
purposes. In order to make the system useful for a security expert, more tools should
be added.
Since adding new tools is an easy process, it should not be really difficult. The most
important aspect of this improvement is the fact that a security expert with knowledge on
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penetration testing would make this improvement really faster than a regular developer
with no prior knowledge about penetration testing.
Another interesting improvement that could be easily implemented is the following one.
Starting from the deployment mode created with the virtual machine, a cloud-based
service could be offered. This would mean upgrading the user system, adding extra
security layers. This upgraded product could be offered to companies as a service. This
service could be useful for system administrators, because they could have an easy way
to test if their system had some security problems. On top of that, the system could be
launched automatically at fixed time intervals and then get a notification if the results
of an audit where different from the previous one.
The cloud-based system would need to have some issues under consideration, like the
availability of the service and the efficiency of the system, which are facts that where
not considered on this project. Probably some multiprocessing should be implemented
in order to improve the efficiency.
Other functionalities that could be included in a close future would be the ability for
user to see which tools where executed and where, and whether they discovered some-
thing new, they crashed, or they executed normally without adding new information.
This would simply mean building a logging system that was available from the user’s
perspective. Another good improvement would be adding a diff function to the system,
both in the logging system and in the results between two different audits. This would
make it really easy for the tester using the system if new vulnerabilities were found in
the system under study.
6.4 Conclusions
In this project, a lot of research about penetration testing has been done. This research
has allowed the building of a system that helps with the first steps of performing pene-
tration tests.
The system that has been built is a functional one, it does what it was expected for it to
do, with the only drawback of having less tools than the desired ones. Several problems
where found during the development of this project, some of them were fixed, and some
were not, but a lot has been learned from them.
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The deployment method chosen for the project has opened new ways of exploiting it,
opening the system to other markets that were not initially planned. This new markets
could offer a good way of making money out of the project, which is another aspect of
the system that was not planned.
Personally, I have learned a lot of things while making this project. Besides from the fact
that I learned to program in Python, there were more important things that I learned.
The field of computer science where this project resides was relatively unknown to me
before doing it. Learning how the penetration testing process worked was one of the
most interesting things that I did. Lots of tools were discovered, and a lot of practise
using some of them was gained. Besides from the penetration testing process, I learned
that not everything is easy to automate, there are resources that still do not exist that
are needed to fully automate the penetration testing process, and even when this is
accomplished, the existence of a security professional is still needed, because most of the
vulnerabilities present in web site or networks need the perspicacity that only a human
being can have.
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